Disclaimer: English Kinda Thing

The sole purpose of the "English Kinda Thing" is to document my attempts to correct my own mistakes in standard English usage and to share the resources I find. In no way do I attempt to teach nobody English through these blurbs--just as I intend not to teach nobody to be a neurotic and psychotic handicap in Ratology Reloaded or Down with Meds! :-)

Wednesday, October 16, 2013

Wittenberg (2010) Experience, cortical remapping, and recovery in brain disease

Wittenberg, G. F. (2010) Experience, cortical remapping, and recovery in brain disease. Neurobiology of Disease, 37(2), 252-258.

A nice review paper on neuroplasticity and brain damages... with what I love the most... the closing remark:

"The idea of a map is useful only if we have somewhere to go; at times acting locally is more important."


Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Ploghaus, Narain, Beckmann, Clare, Bantick, Wise, Matthews, Rawlins, & Tracey (2001) Exacerbation of pain by anxiety is associated with activity in a hippocampal network

Ploghaus, A., Narain, C., Beckmann, C. F., Clare, S., Bantick, S., Wise, R., Matthews, P. M., Rawlins, J. N. & Tracey, I. (2001) Exacerbation of pain by anxiety is associated with activity in a hippocampal network. J Neurosci, 21(24), 9896-903.


"The present study showed that anxiety-induced hyperalgesia is associated with activation in the entorhinal cortex of the hippocampal formation. This is consistent with the Gray–McNaughton theory, which proposes that during anxiety, the hippocampal formation increases the valence of aversive events to prime behavioral responses adaptive to the worst possible outcome. Our observation helps to interpret anatomical, neuropharmacological, and electrophysiological evidence implicating the hippocampal formation in pain modulation. Our finding suggests that accurate preparatory information during medical and dental procedures
alleviates pain by disengaging the hippocampal formation. Searching for interventions to specifically modulate hippocampal activation offers an approach to identifying new treatments for procedural pain and some forms of chronic pain."

Who can assert control over entorhinal cortex? Orbitofrontal cortex--the area associated with metacognition in the affective domain in Dynamic Filtering theory?  Like, I know I am in chronic pain and discomfort... get ready for it, get habituated and tune it down many a blue moon ago already!

Tuesday, September 24, 2013

Wagner, Schacter, Rotte, Koutstaal, Maril, Dale, Rosen, & Buckner (1998) Building memories: Remembering and forgetting of verbal experiences as predicted by brain activity

Wagner, A. D., Schacter, D. L., Rotte, M., Koutstaal, W., Maril, A., Dale, A. M., Rosen, B. R. & Buckner, R. L. (1998) Building memories: Remembering and forgetting of verbal experiences as predicted by brain activity. Science, 281(5380), 1188-91.

Did Wagner et al mention the role of the Ventrolateral PFC in the encoding of remembered vs. forgotten info??


First, remember that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex corresponds to Brodmann's Areas 44, 45, and 47.

"Importantly, the event-related design also permitted identification of regions that demonstrate differential activation during the encoding of words subsequently remembered and those subsequently forgotten. When comparing high confidence hits to misses, greater activation was noted in multiple left prefrontal regions (Fig. 2) and left parahippocampal and fusiform gyri (Fig. 3) (16, 17)"  (p. 1190)

Baldo, Shimamura, Delis, Kramer, & Kaplan (2001) Verbal and design fluency in patients with frontal lobe lesions

Baldo, Shimamura, Delis, Kramer, & Kaplan (2001) Verbal and design fluency in patients with frontal lobe lesions. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society : JINS, 7(5), 586-96.

Participants: "Patients’ lesions were mostly confined to ventral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex"

Problem retrieving information from LTM in verbal fluency:  the frontal lobe patients produced fewer correct
responses than control participants (see Figure 4)

Perservative error in design fluency: In terms of perseverative errors, there was no statistical difference between patients with frontal lesions and control participants (F(1,20)= 1.56, p= .22], although numerically patients made proportionally more errors (see Table 2).

Knight, Scabini & Woods (1989) Prefrontal cortex gating of auditory transmission in humans

Knight, R. T., Scabini, D. & Woods, D. L. (1989) Prefrontal cortex gating of auditory transmission in humans. Brain Research, 504(2), 338-342.

"inhibitory and excitatory prefrontal control of distributed neural activity in posterior brain regions."

I came to this article to find this... Prefrontal cortex has inhibitory and excitatory control over the posterior brain regions. 

I know there is research somewhere else looking directly at the kaput head of psychotics.  Unfortunately, my head doesn't allow me to go directly into these research... not until my psychotic model is done and lit review zum ended (Do you understand what it means?) Sign

P. 165
"There is extensive literature supporting an abnormality in prefrontal function in schizophrenics. Findings of altered dorsolateral prefrontal function include evidence from both cerebral blood flow (Weinberg, Berman & Zec, 1986; Weinberg, Berman, Suddath & Torrey, 1992) and post-mortem studies (Akbarian et al., 1995, 1996). Thus, schizophrenia may represent a ``non-lesion'' model of prefrontal dysfunction in humans. Schizophrenics are also reported to have a deficit in inhibitory control of auditory processing. Freedman and colleagues developed and ERP auditory gating paradigm to study inhibitory control in schizophrenics. In normals, presentation of a pair of clicks results in a decrease in amplitude of the evoked response to the second stimulus in the pair. This response suppression occurs in a latency range of 30±65 msec and has been referred to as the P50 gating paradigm in the schizophrenia literature. This finding has been disputed by some authors (Kathman & Engel, 1990), but this may be due in part to di€erences in recording parameters and state of alertness (Boutros, Zouridakis & Overall, 1991a; Boutros, Overall & Zouridakis, 1991b; Smith, Boutros & Schwarzkopf, 1994; Grith, Ho€er, Adler & Zerbe, 1995). Freedman, Adler, Waldo, Pachtman and Franks (1983) reported that the second stimulus in a pair of auditory pulses did not habituate in schizophrenics. This electrophysiological findings supported the longstanding proposal that schizophrenics
fail to properly filter extraneous inputs (McGhie & Chapman, 1961; Venables, 1964).

This auditory gating deficit is reliably seen in a signi®cant percentage of nonpsychotic relatives of schizophrenics and has been proposed to be a neurophysiologicl trait for schizophrenia. Phenotypic segregation of schizophrenics and first order relatives using the auditory gating paradigm has been employed in recent genetic studies. This research has isolated a putative schizophrenia gene localized to a region of chromosome 15q 13±14 which controls alpha 7 nicotinic receptor expression (Freedman et al., 1997). Thus, the neural network controlling the P50 gating deficit is of both theoretical and clinical relevance. We examined auditory gating in patients with dorsolateral prefrontal damage and in age-matched controls (see Fig. 3). An initial study has shown that controls have normal suppression of the second stimulus in an auditory pulse pair. Prefrontal patients showed evidence of an inhibitory failure in the auditory gating paradigm in both ears. As can be seen in Fig. 3, prefrontal patients showed problems with suppression of the second stimulus in both ears with the defect more apparent in the ear contralateral to prefrontal damage
(Knight, Finkbeiner & Lawler, in preparation). This failure to suppress is observed for both an early latency component generated in auditory cortex (P35) and a later component (P50) thought to arise in the thalamus. The data suggests that prefrontal cortex dysfunction may underlie or contribute to the auditory gating deficit in schizophrenics."

Monday, September 16, 2013

As evident/evidenced by?

I am very happy today because a mistake I habitually make was brought to my attention today...

Donno where I got it... but I have a liking to use the expression "as evident by blah blah and blah."

I learn today that it is actually as evidenced by (or as evident from...).

EX. There is no cure in my bad English as evidenced by all them mistakes I can not catch myself or continue to make even after they are identified such as in "the" and "a(n)."

8-O lol 8-X

(Though, at least, I will correct all them "as evident by" to "as evident from" in my writing from now on.)

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Gagné & Smith Jr (1962) A study of the effects of verbalization on problem solving

Gagné, R. M. & Smith Jr, E. C. (1962) A study of the effects of verbalization on problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63(1), 12-18.

n-disc problem (Tower of Honoi)


  1. Group V-SS (verbalizing, Solution Set) was instructed to state aloud why they were making each individual move at the time they made it. In addition, these 5s were instructed to try to think of a general rule by means of which they could tell someone
  2. Group V (Verbalizing, No Solution Set) was required to verbalize a reason for each move, but was
  3. not instructed to try to formulate a general rule for solution. 
  4. Group SS (No Verbalizing, Solution Set) was not required to verbalize, but was instructed to try to formulate a rule.
  5. Group No (No Verbalizing, No Solution Set) was simply told of the problem to be presented and its ground rules, with no additional instructions.

The group instructed to verbalize and to formulate a rule yielded the best performance.

Could my psychotic pursuit to get the book out and to explicate my problem and action schema be helpful in my learning to problem solve my mental problem? 8-O

Thursday, September 5, 2013

Stanovich (1999) Who is rational? : Studies of individual differences in reasoning

Where system 1 and system 2 are coined...

Stanovich, K. E. (1999) Who is rational? : Studies of individual differences in reasoning,  (Mahwah, N.J., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).

"It helps to distinguish between evolutionary adaptation and instrumental rationality.... Anderson (1990) accepted Stich's... argument that evolutionary adaptation (hereafter termed evolutionary rationality) does not guarantee perfect human rationality in the normative sense." (p. 148)

"Evolutionary rationality has dissociated from normative rationality--where the later viewed as utility maximization for the individual organism (instrumental rationality) and the former is defined as survival probability at the level of the gene." (p. 149)

"It is hypothesized that the features of System 1 are designed to very closely track increases in the reproduction probability of genes.  System 2, though also clearly an evolutionary product, is primarily a control system focused on the interest of the whole person.  Although its overall function was no doubt fitness enhancing, it is the primary maximizer of an individual's personal utility.  Maximizing the latter will occasionally result in sacrificing genetic fitness.

(Why I am not even entertaining having children? 8-O lol 8-X)

Thus, the hypothesis is that System 1 is more specifically attuned than is System 2 to evolutionary rationality.  System 1 process represent the collection of the processes that are goal maximizing for the genes--the reproductive goals of fecundity, longevity, and replication accuracy.  System 2, in contrast, maximizes goal satisfaction for people--the survil machines for the genes.  Because System 2 is more attuned to normative rationality, it is System 2 that will seek to fulfill the individual's goals in the minority of cases where those goals conflict with the responses triggered by system 1.

... in the vast majority of mundane situations, the evolutionary rationality embodied in System 1 processes will also serve the goals of normative rationality.  Accurately navigating around objects in the natural world fostered evolutionary adaptation, and it likewise serves our personal goals as we carry out our lives in the modern world... Nevertheless, the assumption that we are adapted in the evolutionary sense--the assumption made in so many of the adaptionist models--does not entail normative rationality.  Thus, situations where evolutionary and normative rationality dissociate might well put the two processing systems in conflict with each other." (p. 151)

System 2 theory... there is no uni-reality in life and the personal System 1 components devised for mes, myselves, and Is... as a pursuit to cope with psychosis.  What I have to do might not maximize the survival of the "genetic fitness" though instrumental of letting me kick on kicking finishing up spitting out already too many my words.  

Albeit evolutionary this and that, isn't the grasping of the dual-reality principle yet another manifestation of genetic preparedness? 

Regardless, the gene prepared us and the socialization further foster what we are prepared for... how it is interpreted... dependent on the interpreter...

Sunday, September 1, 2013

Morris, Griffiths, Le Pelley, & Weickert (2013) Attention to irrelevant cues is related to positive symptoms in schizophrenia

Morris, R., Griffiths, O., Le Pelley, M. E. & Weickert, T. W. (2013) Attention to irrelevant cues is related to positive symptoms in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 39(3), 575-582.

"suggests normal selective learning can occur in schizophrenia under easier task conditions."

So say the experts... thank God... it's possible for me to learn...

"those with more severe positive symptoms failed to ignore the nonpredictive cues, suggesting the bias also varies with the severity of positive symptoms."

Let me tell you... when symptoms are really bad... all the irrelevant are relevant and like how the song goes... can't take my eyes off from you... (no switching allowed almost)

"The failure of these patients to distinguish between previously predictive and nonpredictive cues results in the formation of abnormal causal associations and suggests this deficit may be critical in the formation and experience of psychotic symptoms."

I would like to say that I would definitely second this notion except... who gives a rat's ass about my endorsement? (Especially not this paranoid delusional with grandiosity. 8-O lol 8-X)

Finally done with this iteration of lit review... 

Peters, Pickering, Kent, Glasper, Irani, David, Day, & Hemsleym (2000) The relationship between cognitive inhibition and psychotic symptoms

Peters, E. R., Pickering, A. D., Kent, A., Glasper, A., Irani, M., David, A. S., Day, S. & Hemsley, D. R. (2000) The relationship between cognitive inhibition and psychotic symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109(3), 386-395.

The hypothetical endowment of psychotics... low latent inhibition... no wonder the process of literature review is so lengthy because everything seems to be related. 8-O 8-X

From public access...

Spread the info so lessons learned could be shared... like... how many psychotics might have access to the sea of literature about us including writings by psychotics about psychosis?

The Sickness in Writing

Treisman (1960) Contextual cues in selective listening

Treisman, A. M. (1960) Contextual cues in selective listening. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12(4), 242-248.

"In using the word “threshold” in this context, it is not necessarily meant to imply an intensity threshold, which might be one possibility, but simply that the unit is more or less likely to be activated by incoming signals, or that it is made more or less quickly available. Now if the selective mechanism in attention acts on all words not coming from one particular source by “attenuating” rather than “blocking” them, that is, it transforms them in such a way that they become less likely to activate dictionary units, it might still allow the above classes of words, with their thresholds which were originally exceptionally low, to be heard."

Treisman's "threshold" hypothesis and possibly the grandfather notion (threshold) of salience differences? (not sure but surely can be inferred from it.

Turk, Brady-Van Den Bos, Collard, Gillespie-Smith, Conway & Cunningham (2013) Divided attention selectively impairs memory for self-relevant information

Turk, D. J., Brady-Van Den Bos, M., Collard, P., Gillespie-Smith, K., Conway, M. A. & Cunningham, S. J. (2013) Divided attention selectively impairs memory for self-relevant information. Memory & Cognition, 41(4), 503-510.

"the memory advantages associated with self-referential encoding are dependent on the availability of attentional resources."

How does this paper resonate with my head?

  1. Self-referencing is attentionally demanding and could thus compete with other attentionally demanding task.  Worst of all, don't know about for the normal, self-referencing info are prioritized.
  2. The memory advantage of self-associated items is possibly what contribute to my plights... (the fuzzy boundary between good and bad)
  3. Given the need for the attentional resource, does the need to engage in other attentional demanding task depletes the "advantage" of self-referenced items?  Based on my "field" experiences such as working at large, yes, when highly focused on my work, I could attempt to minimize the impacts of self-related items... though it ain't fail-safe.

Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen (1997) Personal names and the attentional blink: A visual "cocktail party" effect

Shapiro, K. L., Caldwell, J. & Sorensen, R. E. (1997) Personal names and the attentional blink: A visual "cocktail party" effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 23(2), 504-514.

"Treisman (1960) proposed that the filter is not an "all or nothing" mechanism but instead serves to attenuate rather than to block information from the unattended channel. According to her views, a node for a particular word in a mental "dictionary" possesses a threshold that must be exceeded for that word to reach "awareness." Information from the unattended channel is transformed in such a way as to make it less likely that the information will activate a particular node. Thus, only words with very low thresholds can be activated by the unattended channel. For example, words with high salience, such as fire or an individual's name, have thresholds for activation that are permanently lower than those for other words and can reach awareness even when presented to the unattended channel." p. 506

Sounds almost like... "ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS"  if not all stimuli are euqual but some stimuli are more equal than others.  8-X

"As posed originally by Shapiro, Raymond, and Amell (1994) but elaborated on here, each competing stimulus possesses a different weighting according to its salience, which is determined by a goodness-of-fit match between target and probe templates and the level of word logogen activation."

When can I stop weighting my selves so much?

"we suggest that certain words possess a permanently lower threshold (and thus a higher salience), as
in the case of a person's own name or a signal for danger. We further argue that the consequence of this higher salience is less interference between the probe stimulus and other competing items in VSTM."

salience vs. threshold level

"One's own name, by this same account, possesses an even higher salience allowing for its detection regardless of the distractor stream."

Again, the basis of my minor inconveniences in life... I surely know no moderation and taken the own name effect to the extreme... like You can call me Al (or Betty will do) though I am ratprincess.  

Saturday, August 31, 2013

Jacobson, Karlsgodt, Sanz, Van Erp, Nuechterlein, Bearden, & Cannon, (2010) Reduced ability to engage default-mode brain regions during the resting-state periods of a working memory task in recent-onset schizophrenia

Jacobson, S. C., Karlsgodt, K. H., Sanz, J. H., Van Erp, T. G. M., Nuechterlein, K. H., Bearden, C. E. & Cannon, T. D. (2010) Reduced ability to engage default-mode brain regions during the resting-state periods of a working memory task in recent-onset schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 117(2–3), 347.

Forget about the issue of connectivity... a major issue I have had in my life, once the engine starts, I can't make it stop.  Thought I was going crazy... (yes, I am).  The reason why I don't even want to get it started...

Madre, Pomarol-Clotet, Mckenna, Radua, Ortiz-Gil, Panicali, Goikolea, Vieta, Sarró, Salvador, & Amann, (2013) Brain functional abnormality in schizo-affective disorder: An fmri study

Madre, Pomarol-Clotet, Mckenna, Radua, Ortiz-Gil, Panicali, Goikolea, Vieta, Sarró, Salvador, & Amann, (2013) Brain functional abnormality in schizo-affective disorder: An fmri study. Psychological Medicine, 43(1), 143-53.

Even if I subscribe to the diagnosis of schizoaffective... still out of whack is my private neuronetworks like default mode network...

Baliki, Geha, Apkarian & Chialvo (2008). Beyond Feeling: Chronic Pain Hurts the Brain, Disrupting the Default-Mode Network Dynamics

Baliki, Marwan N., Geha, Paul Y., Apkarian, A. Vania, & Chialvo, Dante R. (2008). Beyond Feeling: Chronic Pain Hurts the Brain, Disrupting the Default-Mode Network Dynamics. The Journal of Neuroscience, 28(6), 1398-1403. 

One more reason for my shrunken brain... Well, don't sweat the small think... my head department already got it started over a decade ago... (therefore... get done with my work fast before my brain escape through the wormhole) 8-O lol 8-X sign

"By design, the present study cannot provide mechanistic explanations. However, the disruption of functional connectivity observed here with increased CBP duration may be related to the earlier observation of brain atrophy increasing with pain duration also in CBP patients (Apkarian et al., 2004b)."

Otti, Guendel, Wohlschlager, Zimmer, & Noll-Hussong (2013). Frequency shifts in the anterior default mode network and the salience network in chronic pain disorder

Otti, Alexander, Guendel, Harald, Wohlschlager, Afra, Zimmer, Claus, & Noll-Hussong, Michael. (2013). Frequency shifts in the anterior default mode network and the salience network in chronic pain disorder. BMC Psychiatry, 13(1), 84. 

Yet another article showing why my head is atama shorto (short-circuted)... above and beyond the contribution of mental health problems.

Lopez, Juan Carlos. (2002). Nature vs nurture

Lopez, Juan Carlos. (2002). Nature vs nurture. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3, 171-171. 

Synaptic plasticity?

"the absence of EphB2 impairs long-term synaptic plasticity"

  1. Takasu, M. A. et alModulation of NMDA receptor-dependent calcium influx and gene expression through EphB receptorsScience 295, 491–495 (2002)
  2. Grunwald, I. C. et alKinase-independent requirement of EphB2 receptors in hippocampal synaptic plasticityNeuron 32, 1027–1040 (2001)
  3. Henderson, J. T. et alThe receptor tyrosine kinase EphB2 regulates NMDA-dependent synaptic functionNeuron 32, 1041–1056 (2001)

Jung, C. G. (1980). The archetypes and the collective unconscious

Jung, C. G. (1980). The archetypes and the collective unconscious (R. F. C. Hull, Trans.). In R. F. C. Hull (Ed.), The collected works of C G Jung (2nd ed., Vol. 9, pp. 42-53). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

My Apocalypses as a type of archetypes?  Bet I am not the only psychotic who had lived through one apocalypse after another!

Friday, August 30, 2013

Conway, Cowan & Bunting (2001). The cocktail party phenomenon revisited: The importance of working memory capacity

From extended LTM activation (high capacity) to low cognitive capacity.  It all makes sense.  Why?  Dedicated to the rightfully wrong processes la! Like... Oh... nice processor with high processing power... but... what is your high speed doing exactly? lol 8-X 

Conway, Andrew R.A., Cowan, Nelson, & Bunting, Michael F. (2001). The cocktail party phenomenon revisited: The importance of working memory capacity. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8(2), 331-335. 

"we show that subjects who detect their name in the irrelevant message have relatively low working-memory capacities, suggesting that they have difficulty blocking out, or inhibiting, distracting information."

This is why I have always proposed that we psychotics have to find ways to expand da processing capacity of ours.  Having a chunk of WM capacity dedicated to processing of psychotic cognition to begin with, there is surely not much capacity left to perform things like blocking out, or inhibiting, distracting information.  Gotta make sure the surplus is not dedicated to psychotic cognition though.  How to?  A good question.

Cherry (1953). Some Experiments on the Recognition of Speech, with One and with Two Ears.

In the sea of stimuli, real or not, what might have influences on what I attend to?  


Cherry, Edward Colin. (1953). Some Experiments on the Recognition of Speech, with One and with Two Ears. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 25(5), 975-979.  

"How do we recognize what one person is saying when the others are speaking at the same time (the cocktail party problem)?"

I did have big time problem focusing what people were saying when my voices and delusional thoughts were running wild!  When the time is really bad, the person speaking to me would be talking to me in real life and telepathically communicate with me as well.  How do I then separate the source?  An interesting question.

Moray, N. (1959). Attention in dichotic listening: Affective cues and the influence of instructions

In search of the general basis of my "self/egocentric" processing... involving hallucinations or not.  Why can't I concentrate on what I want to do but keep on getting distracted by hallucinations and delusions about things related to me?  Taking the good old cocktail party effect to the extreme?


Moray, N. (1959). Attention in dichotic listening: Affective cues and the influence of instructions. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 11(1), 56-60.

"Subjectively 'important' messages, such as a person’s own name, can penetrate the block: thus a person will hear instructions if they are presented with his own name as part of the rejected message."

Thursday, August 29, 2013

Sternberg, Robert J. (2007). Who Are the Bright Children? The Cultural Context of Being and Acting Intelligent

The cultural impact on the definition of intelligence is described in this paper.

Sternberg, Robert J. (2007). Who Are the Bright Children? The Cultural Context of Being and Acting Intelligent. Educational Researcher, 36(3), 148-155. 

How is culture defined here (how it is used)? (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992)

  • Descriptively to characterize a culture
  • historically to describe the tradition of a group
  • normatively to express rules and norms of a group
  • psychologically to emphasize how a group learns and solve problems
  • structurally to emphasize the organizational elements of a culture
  • genetically to describe cultural origins
"Could the psychotic population be considered as belong to a culture?" That's the question.

The theory of successful intelligence 
Definition of Successful intelligence: "What is needed for success in life, according to one's own definition of success, within one's sociocultural context."

What is success to me? To be functional (sorry about the seemingly lack of ambition... though it's in reality really ambitious).

The knowledge and skills are acquired through analytical, creative, and practical abilities:
  • capitalizing on strength
  • correcting or compensating for weakness
  • adapting to, shaping, or selecting environments
I surely know a thing or two in the compensation department.

Different cultures have different conceptions of intelligence...

What does it mean to perform intelligently?
  1. Brazilian street children who could not perform school math could satisfactorily do the same math in the context of selling on the street.
  2. Children in the villages used their tacit knowledge of these medicines an average of once a week in medicating themselves and others.  More than 95% of the children suffered from parasitic illness... how to use any of the natural herbal medicines to combat the diverse and abundant parasitic illnesses they might acquire in rural Kenya. "To these children in rural Kenya, however, the intelligence needed for survival and success in life, in general, may not be the same as intelligence needed for success in school, and the former may be more important to them than the later."
  3. Yup'ik Eskimo children in southwestern Alaska... possessed knowledge about hunting, fishing, gathering, herbal treatments of illness...  They could take a dogsled from their village to another village in the dead of winter and find their way.  [People without the knowledge] would fail to discern the landmarks and quickly would get lost.
"In every culture, people have to recognize when they have problems, define what the problems are, solve the problems, and then evaluate how well they have solved them.  But the content of the problems to be solved is different, and what is considered a good solution differs as well."

Psychotic intelligence?  Does it exist?  For yours paranoid delusional with grandiosity, the word "intelligence" itself is one to run away from for the sake of my life.  Yet, given how psychosis is stigmatized, I would like to use Sternberg's notion as a means to speak to my psychotic fellows... whether it sounds presumptuous or not.

There surely are a lot of them out there who have done great things albeit their psychosis.  There are also people like me... striving for my own success... with success defined as surviving functionally.  So we stumble along in our own version of psychosis, and strive to keep our heads above the sea of symptoms.  How we learn to live since our onset is the development of psychotic intelligence in process, and what we learn to do to keep ourselves functional... starting from taking care of ourselves... is the psychotic intelligence in practice. Unless you make an attempt to explicate it, most of the times, they are tacit and practical knowledge we have.

Sure, our psychotic intelligence could only go so far as to keep ourselves in one piece and be functional.  It will not lead us to big money, big career, etc.  Yet, it's the foundation... because, don't know about you, when I was in the psychiatric ward, I was definitely incapable of performing tasks and doing jobs.  In real life, I have also lost a whole lot of promises... starting from a job.  So, have no doubt in the fact that, if you are still functional, what your suffering granted you is more than minor inconveniences in life... it's intelligence in an unconventional perspective... something obtained incrementally while always have room to improve and more to gain.

It doesn't mean that we should be sitting home being all grandiose about how psychotically intelligent we are... oops... no.  Rather, our psychotic intelligence is a means to survive ourselves... thereafter... grounded in our psychotic intelligence, we can try to compensate our weakness and to survive in the presumably ordinary world and do the ordinary chores.

You are intelligent... with that intelligence practical and incremental.

(Done with what I intend to say... reverting back to running away from the notion of intelligence, success, etc)

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Sternberg, R. J. (1986). Inside Intelligence

To begin with, it seems to serve my ego better to subscribe to Dweck's notion that intelligence is incremental rather than fixed... and therefore... within individual comparison.

Sternberg, R. J. (1986). Inside Intelligence: Cognitive science enables us to go beyond intelligence tests and understand how the human mind solves problems. American scientist, 74(2), 137-143.

"Cognitive, or non-executive processes, and metacognitive, or executive processes."

How Sternberg differentiated between cognition and metacognition... the notion of executive function.

Cognitive processes: Performance

Psychotic Intelligence (aspects of human intelligence uncovered by Sternberg based on observations made about analogy problem solving)

Psychotic Intelligence is something needed not by the non-psychotics and might be difficult for them to develop since they are not granted with hallucinations and delusions as the learning context (hope it doesn't make it sound to psychoticentric... but... lucky them... like me before the onset).    
  • Higher scorers on intelligence test are "faster at inferring, mapping, and applying relations, and at communicating their response to analogy problems." (p. 138)
I have been mighty fast in doing these... float like a cadillac and sting like a beemer... in the processing of my psychotic cognition.  The outcome? Cuckoo... cuckoo...  because... faster in the wrong way.  Today, I try to be fast in doing these things except what I have to be fast in is, in theory, the antipsychotic cognition... "Is it symptomatic and what could I do with it?" Since I have no control over the speed of processing in psychotic cognition, I can only work on my antipsychotic cognition.  If info deemed symptomatic and alike, conscious efforts in encoding, abort (at least try to).  Am I scoring higher in this psychotic intelligence test than when I was even more of a fledgling?  Honestly, donno.
  • Higher scorers were slower at encoding the information that they later manipulated... making sure information is encoded right. 
In comparison to how I function, such as at the onset, I think I have had to learn to slow down the processing of information substantially and dumping the encoding process if possible.  

Why learning it?  Nothing grand... just seems to be what's needed to survive... that's it.  I can't prove it to you or myself... but it feels like, throughout the years, I have been forced to learn to observe but not do anything... unless there seems to be something important about the observation... like... all them stairs to get up to and down from the Big Buddha... at the beginning of the trip in Hong Kong... let me analyze the situation.  

It's a way for me to learn to live with the psychotic cognition--the never-ending need to analyze situations and to intervene... Shall I have no bearing on psychotic cognition that is more than difficult to control, let me cut down on what I have control over... an attempt to give unresting my mind some slack.  Following Sternberg's notion, hope this means that I am becoming more psychotically intelligent than I was... at least as an even more fledgling psychotic at the onset.  This actually reminds me of a scene in "The Island."

"The only thing you can count on is that people will do anything to survive. I just want to live. I don't care how." ~ Lincoln Six Echo

Funny enough, for me, to survive, to slow the cognitive processing down including encoding... like... dumb me down to the lowest common denominator.  8-O lol sigh
  • People spend their time quite unevenly on the various mental operation... (e.g., encoding, inferring relations, mapping relations of a higher order, applying relations) 

Cognitive processes: Learning

  1. Selective-encoding: Alexander Fleming's discovery of penicillion--how on earth did the bacteria near the moldy thing get destroy? (What to attend to... features and attributes of my symptoms.)
  2. Selective-combination: Darwin's theory of natural selection--same birds seen by everyone and Darwin thought... what up with the beak of them birds? (Observations of my mental and physical states of being... what might be the contributing fact and how can I mitigate the impact?  Like, in times of dosage adjustment, I felt really no good last night and decided to take my meds a bit earlier... and it got part of the issues resolved.)
  3. Selective-comparison: Kekule's discovery of the structure of the benzene ring--there is something interesting between the snake in the dream and the structure of the benzene right... (Why didn't I catch my delusions at the second major episode?  Haven't not be exposed to symptoms along the supernatural theme and the impacts, I didn't see the similarity in the symptom structure.)

Metacognitive processes

In this section, the author provided a lot of research-based examples to show the qualitative differences between the seasoned and the not-so-seasoned problem solvers.  

One quote I like especially... to "support" the inevitability of limited my psychotic model in progress...

"No one is able to devote his or her full attention to every problem or every aspect of every problem, and so an important aspect of intelligence is deciding just how one's resources, and especially attentional resources, should be allocated." (p. 142)

Not to mention, am I sure am I sure whether I am really doing any better than before other than making comparison using things stored in my kaput LTM and kaput executive processes?  There's not even validity in the world as I see it (though reliably not shared by people other than mes, myselves, and Is)... garbage in, garbage out... how kosher could the outcome of the comparison be? 8-O lol

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

Frankish & Evans (2009). The duality of mind: An historical perspective

Frankish, Keith, & Evans, Jonathan St B. T. (2009). The duality of mind: An historical perspective. In J. S. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds : dual processes and beyond (pp. 1-35). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Lord... apparently... the system 1 and 2 can be trace all the way back to Mr. Plato... 8-O

(Never would I be able to make the association myself.)

  1. Freud: System 1--> id; system 2--> ego.  
  2. Gestalt psychology: "we can see here an anticipation of contemporary applications of dual-process theory, in which System 2 thinking is seen as necessary to intervene upon default, habitual System 1 thinking, in order for people to solve problems of an abstract or novel nature." (P. 11)
  3. the origin of modern dual-process theories is sometimes cited as stemming from the distinction between controlled and automatic processes in attention made by Schnieder and Shiffrin (1977; also, Shiffrin and Schneider 1977)

After the historical perspectives, on the dawn of the Dual System theory

"The terms ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ were coined by Stanovich (1999), but the dual-system theory 
was devised by a combination of authors, and has much earlier origins." (p. 18)

  1. "Epstein (1994) proposed an integration of Freudian and cognitive ideas about the unconscious. Among contemporary dual-process theorists he is unusual, if not unique, in crediting the Freudian dual-process distinction between primary and secondary process thinking, and also in firmly attaching emotional processing to what has now become known as System 1." (p. 19)
  2. "Evans and Over (1996) developed the notion of implicit and explicit cognitive systems, drawing upon the evolutionary ideas of Reber... consciousness gives us the possibility to deal with novelty and anticipate the future.’ The most distinctive aspect of Evans and Over’s contribution, perhaps, is their emphasis on the idea of hypothetical thinking, which requires imagination of possibilities and mental simulations and the ability to decouple suppositions from actual beliefs. This kind of thinking they argued to be distinctively human and to require the recently evolved, second cognitive system." (p. 20)
  3. "Sloman’s (1996) proposal of two systems of reasoning, described as associative and rule-based respectively." (p. 20)
  4. "Keith Stanovich (1999; 2004; this volume), who coined the terms ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’... he suggests that much educational effort must be devoted to developing System 2 thinking skills. He also suggests that, uniquely among animals, we have a cognitive system (2) on a ‘long-leash’ from the genes, which allows us to rebel and pursue our goals as individuals, and not necessarily those programmed by evolution. " (p. 20)

"The biological brain, Dennett claims, is a collection of specialized hardwired subsystems, operating in parallel and competing for control of action. The conscious mind, on the other hand, is a virtual machine, which we create for ourselves by engaging in various learned behaviours — principally habits of 
private speech, either overt or silent... By engaging in private speech, Dennett argues, we effectively reprogram our biological brains, causing their parallel machinery to mimic the behaviour of a serial computer." (p. 26)

"In the case of utterances, Carruthers argues, such rehearsal generates auditory feedback (inner speech) that is processed by the speech comprehension subsystem and tends to produce effects at the modular level appropriate to the thoughts the utterances express. Since utterances may combine outputs from different modules, this implements a form of domain general thinking, and cycles of mental rehearsal create a flexible domain general reasoning system, using only the basic resources of a modular mind equipped with a language faculty." (P. 26-27) 

Anyone ever wonder why I do so much self-talk... my VM ware at work, I guess... 8-O lol

Carruthers (2009) An architecture for dual reasoning

Carruthers, Peter. (2009). An architecture for dual reasoning. In J. S. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds : dual processes and beyond (pp. 109-128). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

An attempt made by Carruthers to clarify the notion of System 1 and System 2.

"System 2 is realized in cycles of operation of System 1."

This expert opinion seems to be in line with my mumble jumbles...

Saturday, July 20, 2013

Efklides (2006). Metacognition and affect: What can metacognitive experiences tell us about the learning process?

Affect is never my domain since my background is more in cognition... did get something out of this paper... the impact of affect on the processing at the meta and object level (as per the language of Nelson and Narens).

Efklides, Anastasia. (2006). Metacognition and affect: What can metacognitive experiences tell us about the learning process? Educational Research Review, 1(1), 3-14. 

"What I shall try to show is that metacognitive experiences and, especially, metacognitive feelings, have a dual character, that is, a cognitive and an affective one.

1. The facets of metacognition

"Fuzziness in the conceptualization of the term "metacognition" (Flavell, 1987)"

"There are two basic manifestations of the monitoring function, namely, metacognitive knowledge [MK] and metacognitive experience.  Metacognitive skills or use of strategies, on the other hand, are manifestations of the control function."

Please see the following for the facets of metacognition and their manifestation.

"[MK] also comprise knowledge of the criteria of validity of knowledge, what is being called "epistemic cognition.  One could argue that theory of mind is also an instance of MK, although the theorists in the field do not make this connection."

"Metacognitive skills (MS) is procedural knowledge... part of the so called 'executive process' or 'metacognitive strategies... self-regulation cannot be reduced to MS.'"

"The critical question for application of MS, however, is how does the person know when s/he needs to apply MS... Metacognitive experiences (ME) comprise metacognitive feelings and metacognitive judgments/estimates that are based on the monitoring of task-processing feature and/or of its outcome.  They also involve online task-specific knowledge."

"ME are present in working memory... and they can be affectively charged.-- in the case of metacognitive feeling... products of the monitoring of good functioning and have the quality of pleasant and unpleasant.  Thus, metacognitive feelings inform the person about a feature of cognitive processing, but they do it in an experiential way... in the form of a feeling, such as feeling ofknowing, feeling of confidence, etc."

"Metacognitive feelings and metacognitive judgments [e.g., feeling of knowing] are products of nonanalytic, nonconscious inferential processes, particularly when there are conditions that do not allow full analysis of the situation."

"A person working on a learning task... negative affect, be it feeling of difficulty or feeling of dissatisfaction, calls for control decisions.  The control decisions can be triggered automatically, without conscious awareness, or consciously through the analysis of the situation based on one's MK."

"Experts right from  the beginning of task processing identify the critical task features and information, whereas novices refer to superficial task characteristics irrelevant to the procedures needed to deal with the task."

2. Metacognitive experience

Feeling of difficulty is the product of the interaction of factors including the affective factors, such as mood.

3. Metacognitive experiences and affect

"ME monitor the progress being made towards one's goal and they convey this information in an affective or cognitive manner... information can trigger the affective regulatory loop and/or the cognitive one, thus guiding the self-regulatory process in both the short and the long run."

"at least in specific types of task, cognition and emotion co-exist in the processing of information and regulation of behavior.  Furthermore, there is growing neuropsychological evidence that the anterior cingulate cortex is associated with the regulation of both cognitive emotional processing.  This is exactly the area also involved in metacognitive processes."

Keep on seeing anterior cingulate cortex
When all focused on cognitive work, I can be a major league bitch from hell
When emotionally charged and being angry, I can not bring myself back down
Life before hospitalization is one emotionally charged event after another, possibly all dedicated to emotion and cognition... nothing left for metacognition especially in the psychotic department of metacognition.

"One theory that links affect with "meta-" level processes and explains the role of affect in the regulation of cognition is the one proposed by Carver and Scheier (1998) and Carver (2003).  This theory posits two basic types of feedback loop: one feedback loop informs on the attainment of one's goal, whereas the second monitor the rate of the progress towards one's goal.  This is a metalevel feedback loop that manifest subjectively as affect and as a hazy sense of expectancy... positive feelings... inform that there is a discrepancy in the positive direction and, therefore, effort can be reduced.  This easing on effort brings back the system to the dired rate of progress towards the focal goal and, at the same time, frees resources to be invested in the achievement of other possible goals."

"... one possible reason is that negative affect limits the available resources to be invested in the task, so no extra effort was allocated to it."

But how?  That's my question.

"Positive and negative affect, through their interaction with ME, have an immediate affect on the self-regulation of ongoing activity as well as on the person's emotions that endorse engagement with or disengagement from one's goal."

or in me...
Affect-->tie it all up and can't let go of existing processes, cognitively or affectively-->failure to perform task switch (meta, executive)--> possibly simply jammed up the processing power and could it be an indication of the insufficient power of metacognition.

5. Implications for the learning process

"if students rely completely on ready made answers for the solution of problems or on other people's help for dealing with a task, then they do not capitalize on their ME, they do not elaborate on the source of difficulty, and they do not associate their ME with strategies or with procedural knowledge that can resolve the problem they face.  Thus students do not "learn" from their ME and cannot regulate their figure behavior and action successfully."

Learning to live with psychosis is like learning to walk or learning to ride a bicycle.  You simply have to do it and you can't pretend the outcome without going through the motions.

6. Conclusion

"ME are transitory and highly sensitive to person, task, situation and context effects, redering them highly variable.  As a consequence, the information they convey is not always accurate, or may go unnoticed or, even, be misinterpreted.  This implies that one has to "learn" the meaning of his/her ME and understand the conditions that give rise to them if s/he is to be in charge of his/her cognition."

Before anyone else... learn about thyself.

"It seems that increased knowledge and expertise in a domain lead to better calibration of the ME."

The domain of psychosis... the dual-reality world?

As Paris (2002) pointed out, metacognition can be helpful, benign, or debilitating.

Tell me about it... me and my out-of-whack metacognition!  lol sigh

Friday, July 19, 2013

Muñoz (2010). Metarepresentational Versus Control Theories of Metacognition

Muñoz, Santiago Arango. (2010). Metarepresentational Versus Control Theories of Metacognition. Paper presented at the Metacognition for Robust Social Systems.1. Two theories of metacognition

1.1 Metarepresentational theory of metacognition

The necessary structure of metacognitive judgments is composed by
  1. a proposition (e.g., "it rains")
  2. a first-order attitude directed to that representation such as believing or intending, denoted by a mental concept
  3. a second-order attitude, namely a metacognitive judgment, directed to the first order attitude (2) and its proposition (1) (Proust, 2007)
In other words, the content of a second-order representation is necessarily constituted by the self-attribution of a mental concept together with a first-order representation

[3] I believe that [2] I know (or Perceive, believe, feel, etc.) that [1] it rains.

From an epistemological point of view, there should be almost no difference between the knowledge that a subject has about herself and her knowledge about others because both are based on the similar behavioral cues, use the same conceptual resources to make inferences and are produced by the same cognitive mechanism.

Years of learning to think as a psychotic, epistemologically similar or not, I do have problems understand how normal people think and I don't care no more since it ain't like I can afford to think like them... because they have too much slack that I don't have... Like when they make mistakes in thinking, they simply make mistakes, misatribution and misinterpretation; for someone psychotic like me, the consequences are more dire, consequences have consequences and the out-of-bound can have serious real life impacts.  More useful to figure out how I can think to survive in a sea of symptoms.  

1.2. Control theory of metacognition

"The control view on metacognition claims that it is mainly a capacity to evaluate and control our cognitive processes and mental dispositions by means of mental simulation.  In Joelle Proust's words: "The aim is, rather, to evaluate one's present mental dispositions, endorse them, and form epistemic and conative commitments" (Proust, 2009b)... subjects do not need to form a second-order representation about their first order attitudes in order to evaluate and control them."

Two levels of metacognition

"While metarepresentation theorists accuse control theorists of putting too much weight on a sub-personal mechanism, a"gate-keeping mechanism" (Carruthers, 2008, 2009a), control theorists accuse the former of over-intellectualizing a more basic phenomenon (Proust, 2007, 2009c).

"no real disagreement between both theories because they are trying to explain different phenomena."

2.1 High-level: Theory-based metacognition

  1. Some mental concepts that permit her to self-attribute mental states
  2. a language in which to formulate her judgments
  3. a theory of mind, understood as a set of beliefs concerning the functioning of the mind and allowing her to make inferences.
The subject needs a mindreading capacity to self-ascribe mental states.

System 2--characterized as being slow, analytic, controlled and conscious.

Subjects interpret their behavior and make inferences thanks to a theory of mind they posses.

The mental model of how my mind works-->though just because it's empirically useful doesn't mean it's the "true value."

"metacognitive beliefs and theories are not just "faux-thoughts," they do play an important role in the production of behavior."

My unviolated belief that I am psychotic

the main cognitive function of high-level metacognition is interpretive... subjects may often be wrong in their self-interpretative judgments about their own propositional attitudes and cognitive capacities."

"People can be easily deluded concerning the content of their memory since "recognition or direct questioning can have 'contaminating' effects on memory" (Loftus, 1989)

Eyewitness testimony research... memory issue.

"People seem to hold false theories about their memory or their perception."

Tell yours psychotic about it.  Therefore, all could be false with one inviolatable... I am psychotic.

Subjects do not rely on such theories or confabulations to control their cognitive behaviour.  In other words, what they believe they do and what they actually do are not consistent.

Why did DWM got taken down shall I know that I was psychotic?

"many of the reasoning biases, such as the belief bias or the myside bias, are actually caused by the subjects' propensity to accept uncritically (i.e., without an analysis or revision by S2) a heuristic response.

Reasoning bias--> all that has came out of my front door.... interesting.  One reason why I can't do a "qualitative analysis" on my own documentation... similar bias all the way... durchfallen.

2.2 Low-level: experience-based metacognition

Feelings are one kind of output of what cognitive psychologists have called System 1 adn which has been characterized as being fast, based on heuristics, mostly automatic and unconscious.

Symptom schema-->partial matching

"The feeling itself is metacognitive in the sense of being directed towards a mental disposition (knowledge, uncertainty, ignorance, etc.), but the content of the epistemic feeling that determines decision-making is non-conceptual and thus not metarepresentational."

"Low-level metacognition is the capacity of a being 
  • to entertain epistemic feelings that nonconceptually point to mental dispositions and
  • to be able to exploit such feelings in order to control its cognitive activities

3. Interactions, mechanisms and advantages of the two-level account

3.1 Interactions between the two levels

  • high-level: I am psychotic
  • Low-level: Tactics
The author provided 3 examples of the possible interactions.  

I find the third one most "familiar" or "similar to my case.

"When subjects inhibit their propensity to rely on the feelings of familiarity after they are given a theory concerning the unreliability of the feeling."

The theory of the unreliability of the products of my head.

3.2 One or two mechanisms?

The first possibility would imply that high-level metacognition (mindreading) is grounded on low-level metacognition, as the simulation theorist hold... 

Without the onset and the setbacks in my mental status throughout the years, to be honest, the System 2 theory of I am psychotic would be even more incomplete.

"evidence of differences in the bases of metacognitive judgments about self and other."

This is why the scope of the discussion is about mes, myselves, and Is... scoping... think it might be part of the research methodology 101 they taught me in school.

The second possibility is that both levels are distinct mechanisms that have evolved in virtue of different evolutionary pressures to carry out different cognitive functions.

3.3 Some advantages of the two-level account

This is how it might have worked for me--the interaction between system 2 and system 1... though chicken and egg... after the onset, system 2 might be the prerequisite of the system 1 development.

Why did I falter? A combination of system 2 and system 1... with the worst sin... a relaxed attitude at System 2... though, unfortunately, I can produce no evidence to substantiate this postulation.

Shall I falter again, why would it be?  A combination of system 2 and system 1.

Thursday, July 18, 2013

Shimamura (2000). The role of the prefrontal cortex in dynamic filtering

Shimamura, Arthur P. (2000). The role of the prefrontal cortex in dynamic filtering. Psychobiology, 28(2), 207-218.

"four prominent aspects of executive control--selecting, maintaining, updating, and rerouting information process. These four aspects are couched in terms of dynamic filtering theory, which proposes that the prefrontal cortex acts as a selective gating or filtering mechanism that controls information processing."

"Lesions in the ventral region produce an abnormal perseveration of central sets.  A hallmark feature of this deficit is an inability to shift sets in object reversal and go/no-go tasks.  In such tasks, the animal must inhibit an incorrect but dominant response tendency.  In human studies, set-shifting tasks have been used to assess the ability to disengage from one tasks and perform another."

For instance, being delusional--self-centric, everything is about mes, myselves, and Is--is a dominant response tendency... hard wired.  

"Neuropsychological studies of patients with frontal lobe lesions and functional neuroimaging studies of neurologically intact individuals suggest that the dorsolateral region is involved in tasks that require various control processes, such as stimulus selection, working memory, memory retrieval, and set shifting.  Executive control is presumed to enable top-down "supervision" of cognitive processing at various stages, such as perceptual analysis, short-term memory, and response selection."

Aspects of executive control

Selecting activity and focusing attention

"Selective attention refers to the focusing of attention to perceptual features or to information in memory."
  1. Stroop-like effect
  2. Flanker task
"It may be that perceptual or response filtering is less a purview of the prefrontal cortex and is more associated with the anterior cingulate cortex.  Perhaps, selection of information in working memory may be more rooted in prefrontal processing.  In summary, neuropsychological of the anterior cingulate cortex in filtering perceptual or response modes, and there is some evidence for a contributory role of the prefrontal cortex in supporting these functions."

The question I have is... sensory memory is theoretically a store only... nothing gets manipulated.  Bearing in mind Chi's notion or "meta or not," where only second-order is only considered meta.  Wouldn't it make it sound like the executive control is but simple executive control?  Or, if thinking of it the other way, the executive control comes out of the box (sensory memory), from the perspective of the box, that should be meta enough?

Maintaining activity in short-term memory

"Smith et al. found increased left-hemisphere activation for object short-term memory [BA 37], but increased right-hemisphere activation for spatial short-term memory [BA 40]."

"Separate pathways for spatial and object information processing... though it is important to note that both separation and integration of these cortical streams may be critical for executive control."

Updating activity: manipulation of information in short-term memory

"Updating concerns the ability to alter activity levels among items in short-term memory.  Thus, rather than merely maintaining activity, updating involves top-down reorganization of activation levels."
"Failure to monitor and update information leads to perseverations."

Could my perseverance with this DWM book thing be an indicator of the failure to update? 8-O lol sigh

"Efficient learning involves the reorganization of sensory information into meaningful or conceptual representations.  This process requires the integration of new information with existing knowledge.  As such, learning must involve updating and organization of both sensory information and existing knowledge."

Albeit my difficulties in learning in general, my new psychotic symptoms apparently have no difficulty integrating themselves with the old ones stored in LTM... independent of my contribution... almost reaching the state of automaticity... I guess. 8-X

Sources memory...

I could never remember author names, years, and also have problems with terminologies... though I know the concept... even before my psychotic years...  

"Findings from both neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies suggest that the prefrontal cortex is prominently involved in both short-term and long-term memory tasks that involve the updating of memory activations.  In these tasks, it is necessary to rearrange or modulate the level of activations in short-term memory."

Rerouting activity: implementing set shifting

"One aspect that makes rerouting a particularly complex executive function is the need to disengage from and shift to different processing modes... Such internally mediated or volitional shifts in processing may be particularly demanding on executive control processes.  Indeed, rerouting requires shifts in stimulus activations, stimulus processing, and response programming.  As such, it represents one of the most complex forms of executive control."
When reading this section, I thought of the notion of ADL and IADL.  Sure, disruption in the ability to reroute activity/plan switching is an indicator of my head not working too well.  Yet, when is the head most disabled?  When you are struggling with the most basic task... attention.  In a sense, singing Diva's Lament about the inability to reroute from the dominant set called the delusional mental model?  Call it a blessing. 

Dynamic Filtering Theory: A theoretical account of Prefrontal Function

"At the cognitive level, such terms as central executive and supervisor suggest a rather intelligent control mechanism that oversees and manages information processing."

"It is proposed here, that the prefrontal cortex operates as a dynamic filtering mechanism that maintains selected neural activations and gates extraneous or irrelevant ones.  According to this view, at any given moment cortical and subcortical activations involved in sensory and cognitive functioning produce a cacophony of neural signals. The prefrontal cortex, with its extensive projections to and from many cortical and subcortical regions, orchestrates these signals by means of a filtering mechanism that inhibits some signals and maintains activation of others.  In essence, the prefrontal cortex acts to refine activity and increase signal-to noise ratios.  This mechanism may be particularly involved in inhibiting or damping extraneous activity, or "noise." under conditions of extensive interferences."

"Dynamic filtering theory suggests that activation in the posterior cortex initiates a pattern of associated activations in the prefrontal cortex.  By way of reciprocal projections back to the posterior regions, this pattern of activation enables certain neuronal ensembles to be kept active and others to be gated or inhibited.  This mechanism affords a means by which information processing in the posterior cortex can be maintained and modulated by signals from the prefrontal cortex.  Without prefrontal control, the system is subject to greater noise from extraneous activations."

Noise is an interesting concept.  Take my auditory hallucination for instance... the voices could get so busy at work that there is no moment of quietness.  Then, think about it... how does it work... the tuning down of the voices through meds or my blocking the voices in the back of my head (when possible)?  Like what was spoken before... something like at which level does the message get lost or distorted because of the noise--with the message as the reality shared by the others and the noise, psychotic version of reality?  What and where is the threshold etc.?

"Efficient temporal processing may require the clipping of recent active information as a way to segregate neural processing from one moment to another... reflecting an inhibitory signal back... a neural "inhibition of return," which could facilitate attentional shift.  Without this simple control, the system might be subject to perseverations of recent activation."

"Perhaps through experience, we acquire not only a vast amount of knowledge but also a multitude of filters that enable the selection of that knowledge."

"The word animals would not only activate representations in posterior cortical areas but also activate filters in the prefrontal cortex, which then would select, maintain, and modulate associated posterior activations."

Similar to the notion of security software.

"aspects of selection may involve modality-specific processing (e.g., sensory processes), whereas updating and rerouting involve polymodal processing"

Executive Control Process Related Concept Benchmark Task Filtering Mechanism
    Selecting Selective attention Stroop Filter selection
    Maintaining Short-term memory Digital span Filter persistence
    Updating Monitoring n-back Filter switch-stimulus
    Rerouting Set shifting Task switching Filter switch-response

"The notion of selection is less controversial than the notion of active inhibition.  However, some physiological evidence suggest that the prefrontal cortex engages inhibitory control of posterior cortical activity.  Knight and colleagues studied event-related potentials (ERPs) in patients with dorsolateral prefrontal lesions.  In one study, the amplitude of evoked responses presumed to be generated in the primary auditory cortex was potentiated in patients with prefrontal lesions.  Thus, there appeared to be a disinhibition of posterior cortical activity as a result of a frontal lobe lesion."

Hello, World!  My auditory hallucinations!

Regardless the experts' general opinions on inhibition, there is something to the notion of inhibition.  There is a qualitative difference between simply amplifying the signals to attend on and with the amplification coupling with signal inhibition... if what I perceive is the manifestation of inhibition.

Since the notion of Central executive is in the context of working memory and, as mentioned earlier, sensory memory only a store, does this make this executive control worth the meta tag?

"This inhibitory control mechanism may filter or gate sensory information at very early stages of processing."

"Prefrontal regions are performing the same neural function--dynamic filtering--but different behavioral outcomes occur because different prefrontal regions are filtering different posterior cortical regions, which themselves serve different cognitive functions."

"Filtering problems may occur at many levels of information processing, including sensory processing, memory activation, and response selection.  At the level of sensory processing, prefrontal (and anterior cingulate) function may involve the selection and maintenance of sensory signals."

"Demands on dynamic filtering will occur to the extend that irrelevant activations intrude on information processing, such as in tasks involving dominant responses that must be inhibited.  In fact, the ability to inhibit previously dominant memory activation is an important feature of prefrontal control."

How I am wrong.

Emotional control and orbitofrontal cortex    

Metacognition and affect

Dynamic filtering theory in relation to other views

"Dynamic filtering theory offers a neural-based mechanism that enables top-down control of information processing.  This view builds on earlier theories of prefrontal functions... Baddeley's characterization of working memory and the central executive emphasizes activation and maintenance of information in short-term memory... Dynamic filtering theory is consistent with these views in suggesting that the prefrontal cortex is involved in selecting and maintaining activation in short-term memory."

Thank God... thought my low-latent inhibited head was seeing Central Executive... till I see it put down in black and white by the author himself... lol

"Mid-ventrolateral regions are presumed to be involved in first-order executive control processes associated with selection and maintenance of short-term memory.  Mid-dorsolateral regions act as second-order executive processes involved in monitoring and manipulation."

"However, there may be even further, more detailed ways to define the manner in which filtering can affect information processing."

"In terms of behavioral outcome, it is extremely difficult to differentiate a model based purely on selection from a model based on both selection and inhibition.  In the end, the two models can often lead to similar behavioral outcomes."

Again, from the psychotic perspective, there is a qualitative difference although, out of the mouth of a thought-disordered psychotic, a paradoxical notion.

Adaptive resonance theory: analogous to center-on, surround-off receptive fields.

How I am wrong... center on, surround also on.

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Shimamura (2000). Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition

A paper touching upon the question I have between Baddeley's central executive and the control department of metacognition.

Shimamura, Arthur P. (2000). Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition, 9(2), 313-323.

"There is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory, and frontal lobe function." (p. 313)

Metacognition and aspects of executive control

"Fernandez-Duque et all. review findings from basic cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and developmental psychology.  These findings suggest a strong relationship between metacognitive regulation and executive control  They emphasize the biological bases of metacognition and suggest that midfrontal brain region are part of a neural circuit that enables metacognitive regulation." (p. 131)

"There is evidence to suggest that the frontal cortex contributes to metacognition." (p. 314)--similar to central executive.

"investigations of executive control have assessed and defined specific components--such as selecting stimulus information, maintaining information in working memory, and manipulating information processing...  The linking of metacognition to aspects of executive control offers opportunities to define better cognitive components of metacognition.

"As suggested by Fernandez-Duque et al., supervisory models, such as the one proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986) and integrated in Baddeley's model of working memory (Baddeley, 1986), have features that resemble metacognitive control.  In particular, both metacognitive control and executive control share the primary feature of enabling top-down modulation of cognitive process." (p. 315)

"Executive control can be defined as processes involved in the selection, activation, and manipulation of information in working memory.  In terms of the Nelson-Narens model, object-level information that is being monitored is in working memory, and top-down control of that information involves meta-level control." (p. 315)

Aspects of executive control and Dynamic Filtering Theory (p. 316)
Executive process Related concept Benchmark task
Selecting Selective attention Stroop
Maintaining Short-term memory Digit span
Updating Monitoring n-back
Rerouting Set shifting Task switching

"Rerouting involves a global shift of information processing--from stimulus registration to response selection." (p. 317) Task/plan switching

"patients with frontal lobe lesions have difficulty rerouting process from a previously successful or dominant set to a new set."
Albeit the differential etiology, I know what it means to have difficulty rerouting a dominant processing (paranoid delusional with grandiosity) to a new one.

Theories of executive control and frontal lobe function

"Metcalfe's CHARM model (Metcalfe, 1993)... metacognitive evaluations, such as feelings of knowing, are based on a familiarity check that is computed between new information and what is already stored in memory." (p. 318)

"in terms of behavioral outcome, it is extremely difficult to differentiate the selection of appropriate responses from the inhibition of inappropriate responses." (p. 319)
Look into the psychotic population... you will know how important inhibition is...

"There is, however, some physiological evidence to suggest that the prefrontal cortex is involved in inhibiting activation in posterior cortex.  Knight et al. (1989) showed that patients with frontal lobe lesions exhibit posterior evoked potentials that are greater than those observed in control subjects.  That is, sensory evoked potentials appeared to be disinhibited as a result of frontal lobe damage."

Concluding remarks
"Fernandez-Duque et al. integrate emotional and cognitive regulation in their analysis of metacognition."-- cognitive and emotion."

"increased activation in the anterior cingulate for both cognitive regulation and emotional regulation.  It is unclear, however, whether this brain region serves all forms of task setting or selective attention or whether there is some special link between emotional and cognitive control." (p. 320)

As of 2000... wonder things might have changed since?

"To what extent can issues of emotional regulation be linked to metacognitive research?  Perhaps, as suggested by Fernandez-Duque et al, the same brain activations involved in emotional regulation are also involved in cognitive regulation.  Another possibility is that different areas in frontal cortex control different forms of processing.  In other words, there are various metalevel systems that monitor and control different aspects of information processing." (p. 320)