Disclaimer: English Kinda Thing

The sole purpose of the "English Kinda Thing" is to document my attempts to correct my own mistakes in standard English usage and to share the resources I find. In no way do I attempt to teach nobody English through these blurbs--just as I intend not to teach nobody to be a neurotic and psychotic handicap in Ratology Reloaded or Down with Meds! :-)

Friday, July 19, 2013

Muñoz (2010). Metarepresentational Versus Control Theories of Metacognition

Muñoz, Santiago Arango. (2010). Metarepresentational Versus Control Theories of Metacognition. Paper presented at the Metacognition for Robust Social Systems.1. Two theories of metacognition

1.1 Metarepresentational theory of metacognition

The necessary structure of metacognitive judgments is composed by
  1. a proposition (e.g., "it rains")
  2. a first-order attitude directed to that representation such as believing or intending, denoted by a mental concept
  3. a second-order attitude, namely a metacognitive judgment, directed to the first order attitude (2) and its proposition (1) (Proust, 2007)
In other words, the content of a second-order representation is necessarily constituted by the self-attribution of a mental concept together with a first-order representation

[3] I believe that [2] I know (or Perceive, believe, feel, etc.) that [1] it rains.

From an epistemological point of view, there should be almost no difference between the knowledge that a subject has about herself and her knowledge about others because both are based on the similar behavioral cues, use the same conceptual resources to make inferences and are produced by the same cognitive mechanism.

Years of learning to think as a psychotic, epistemologically similar or not, I do have problems understand how normal people think and I don't care no more since it ain't like I can afford to think like them... because they have too much slack that I don't have... Like when they make mistakes in thinking, they simply make mistakes, misatribution and misinterpretation; for someone psychotic like me, the consequences are more dire, consequences have consequences and the out-of-bound can have serious real life impacts.  More useful to figure out how I can think to survive in a sea of symptoms.  

1.2. Control theory of metacognition

"The control view on metacognition claims that it is mainly a capacity to evaluate and control our cognitive processes and mental dispositions by means of mental simulation.  In Joelle Proust's words: "The aim is, rather, to evaluate one's present mental dispositions, endorse them, and form epistemic and conative commitments" (Proust, 2009b)... subjects do not need to form a second-order representation about their first order attitudes in order to evaluate and control them."

Two levels of metacognition

"While metarepresentation theorists accuse control theorists of putting too much weight on a sub-personal mechanism, a"gate-keeping mechanism" (Carruthers, 2008, 2009a), control theorists accuse the former of over-intellectualizing a more basic phenomenon (Proust, 2007, 2009c).

"no real disagreement between both theories because they are trying to explain different phenomena."

2.1 High-level: Theory-based metacognition

  1. Some mental concepts that permit her to self-attribute mental states
  2. a language in which to formulate her judgments
  3. a theory of mind, understood as a set of beliefs concerning the functioning of the mind and allowing her to make inferences.
The subject needs a mindreading capacity to self-ascribe mental states.

System 2--characterized as being slow, analytic, controlled and conscious.

Subjects interpret their behavior and make inferences thanks to a theory of mind they posses.

The mental model of how my mind works-->though just because it's empirically useful doesn't mean it's the "true value."

"metacognitive beliefs and theories are not just "faux-thoughts," they do play an important role in the production of behavior."

My unviolated belief that I am psychotic

the main cognitive function of high-level metacognition is interpretive... subjects may often be wrong in their self-interpretative judgments about their own propositional attitudes and cognitive capacities."

"People can be easily deluded concerning the content of their memory since "recognition or direct questioning can have 'contaminating' effects on memory" (Loftus, 1989)

Eyewitness testimony research... memory issue.

"People seem to hold false theories about their memory or their perception."

Tell yours psychotic about it.  Therefore, all could be false with one inviolatable... I am psychotic.

Subjects do not rely on such theories or confabulations to control their cognitive behaviour.  In other words, what they believe they do and what they actually do are not consistent.

Why did DWM got taken down shall I know that I was psychotic?

"many of the reasoning biases, such as the belief bias or the myside bias, are actually caused by the subjects' propensity to accept uncritically (i.e., without an analysis or revision by S2) a heuristic response.

Reasoning bias--> all that has came out of my front door.... interesting.  One reason why I can't do a "qualitative analysis" on my own documentation... similar bias all the way... durchfallen.

2.2 Low-level: experience-based metacognition

Feelings are one kind of output of what cognitive psychologists have called System 1 adn which has been characterized as being fast, based on heuristics, mostly automatic and unconscious.

Symptom schema-->partial matching

"The feeling itself is metacognitive in the sense of being directed towards a mental disposition (knowledge, uncertainty, ignorance, etc.), but the content of the epistemic feeling that determines decision-making is non-conceptual and thus not metarepresentational."

"Low-level metacognition is the capacity of a being 
  • to entertain epistemic feelings that nonconceptually point to mental dispositions and
  • to be able to exploit such feelings in order to control its cognitive activities

3. Interactions, mechanisms and advantages of the two-level account

3.1 Interactions between the two levels

  • high-level: I am psychotic
  • Low-level: Tactics
The author provided 3 examples of the possible interactions.  

I find the third one most "familiar" or "similar to my case.

"When subjects inhibit their propensity to rely on the feelings of familiarity after they are given a theory concerning the unreliability of the feeling."

The theory of the unreliability of the products of my head.

3.2 One or two mechanisms?

The first possibility would imply that high-level metacognition (mindreading) is grounded on low-level metacognition, as the simulation theorist hold... 

Without the onset and the setbacks in my mental status throughout the years, to be honest, the System 2 theory of I am psychotic would be even more incomplete.

"evidence of differences in the bases of metacognitive judgments about self and other."

This is why the scope of the discussion is about mes, myselves, and Is... scoping... think it might be part of the research methodology 101 they taught me in school.

The second possibility is that both levels are distinct mechanisms that have evolved in virtue of different evolutionary pressures to carry out different cognitive functions.

3.3 Some advantages of the two-level account

This is how it might have worked for me--the interaction between system 2 and system 1... though chicken and egg... after the onset, system 2 might be the prerequisite of the system 1 development.

Why did I falter? A combination of system 2 and system 1... with the worst sin... a relaxed attitude at System 2... though, unfortunately, I can produce no evidence to substantiate this postulation.

Shall I falter again, why would it be?  A combination of system 2 and system 1.

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