Disclaimer: English Kinda Thing

The sole purpose of the "English Kinda Thing" is to document my attempts to correct my own mistakes in standard English usage and to share the resources I find. In no way do I attempt to teach nobody English through these blurbs--just as I intend not to teach nobody to be a neurotic and psychotic handicap in Ratology Reloaded or Down with Meds! :-)

Monday, May 27, 2013

Hubble: Galaxies Across Space and Time

The notion of watching what they were millions of years ago right now... is an interesting one...

5/27/2013 update: Oops... didn't mean to post it in this blog... but... since done... 

Sunday, May 26, 2013

Shimamura, Arthur P. (2008). A neurocognitive approach to metacognitive monitoring and control

Shimamura, Arthur P. (2008). A neurocognitive approach to metacognitive monitoring and control. In J. Dunlosky & R. A. Bjork (Eds.), Handbook of metamemory and memory (pp. 373-390). New York: Psychology Press.

After I read the paper of Nelson and Narens, I came across the paper where Shimamura added the brain components to Nelson and Narens' model of metacognition and addressed the notions in the dynamic filtering theory.

Since I know for sure that the my brain is wired pretty wrong and in different ways, it's pretty cool to read up this paper and say... "Yes! Yes! Yes! I've gotta have problems there, too!"  Sort of reminding me of the experiences I (and some of my classmates) had when taking abnormal psychology for the first time in undergrad.  It seemed like all diagnosis in the neurosis department were applicable to me though I had such difficulties differentiating between delusions and hallucinations.  (Speaking of ignorance is a bless. lol 8-X)

As is shown in the figure above, neurobehavioral research has found the critical role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) on the top-down control of information processing (e.g., Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Shimamura, 2002a; Smith & Jonides, 1999).  Theorists have also worked on mapping out the metacognitive functions of PFC regions (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Shimamura, 1996; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001).

Dynamic filtering theory:  So, first of all, PFC is well connected with many cortical regions.  It was proposed that the well-connected PFC regulates the activation of the posterior cortex by way of a filtering/gating mechanism.  So, in this theory, the meta-level processors in the PFC control those at the object level in the posterior cortex.  How does PFC assert its control?  It's done through dynamic filtering... "the selection of appropriate signals and suppression of inappropriate signals."

The author considered the inhibitory control to be of particular importance because due to the inevitable interference among object-level processors.  When conflicts or interference are observed at the object-level, the meta-level has to make a decision on which process(es) to suppress and which to continue. In the author's own words, "Based on dynamic filtering theory, it is the interplay between PFC and posterior regions that implements both selective and suppressive control."

Also, because different regions of the PFC seems to be in charge of different things (though there might be overlaps in their functions), the way it sound... metacognition in the brain works almost like cloud/distributed computing.  8-O lol  At the end of this paper, the author did ask the question of whether there might be a CEO for the various PFC regions... sort of like... with the anterior PFC (BA10) offered as the plausible candidate.

This paper is also loaded with interesting notions and information; however, I will share with you the thoughts I have rather than providing a summary of the key ideas in this paper.

Monitoring and controlling stimulus encoding

One question that's been troubling me is whether metacognition can assert its impact at as early as the stage of sensory memory.   Why?  As a psychotic, it would be wonderful if hallucinations can get filter out before even entering the working memory so as to prevent the hallucinations from being incorporated in my delusional world (of course, the assumptions: hallucinations are first perceived in the sensory memory and the information processing model holds true).  Nothing intellectual... pure practical.

Though I feel sorry for patients with brain lesions, what the authors addressed in this section gives me hope...  "It is as if PFC lesions disrupt cortical processing in the posterior cortex by failing to gate or filter activations."

Though... questions... the plain old selection mechanism between Sensory memory and Working memory could be considered as metacognitive? 8-O (Interesting... Never thought of it this way... though no answer to it.)

Monitoring and controlling learning process

Notions under this title seem to be related to the functioning of working memory.

While studies have confirmed the role of PFC in the maintenance and manipulation of information in working memory, different prefrontal regions seem to maintain different kinds of information.

There is something interesting about the quote that "successful learning depends on a host of metacognitive control processes, including selection, maintenance, updating, and chunking."  When I first read this quote, so I thought... aren't these ordinary things at the cognitive or object-level?  Then I thought of the cross-sectional studies conducted on young children... how they need to be taught metacognitive strategies to help themselves learn... For instance, perhaps, not random selection or selecting for the purpose of selecting, but... strategic selection...

The discussion on proactive interference  are also very interesting.  Essentially, participants were given stimuli and were asked to determine if a stimuli had been shown to them before.  One group was given cues on whether they should attend to face or scene while the other group not.  It was found that the posterior cortical regions exhibited heightened activities on trials with task-relevant stimuli and reduced activities when task-irrelevant.  At the same time, previous studies have found the selective attention to be modulated by PFC.

Why do I find this discussion interesting?  It's like--you need to give yourself this cue about your observations in life--delusion or not?  If delusional, don't get your head too excited since it is irrelevant.  8-O

Monitoring and controlling retrieval processes

"[V]entrolateral PFC activity increases with increases in the number of competing responses (Wagner et al., 2001). Such regulation of semantic retrieval extends to other linguistic tasks, such as making decisions about the conceptual relatedness between items or interpreting difficult or ambiguous sentences (see Wagner
et al., 2001)."--Feels like it has something to do with delusion of references?

A Multilevel Model of Dynamic Filtering Theory and Extension of the Nelson and Narens Metacognitive Model

How I am wrong...

Biased to the processing of internal stimuli (hallucinations, delusions) and self-related contents

  1. The ventrolateral PFC is integral in selecting semantic information and maintaining that information in working memory (Wagner et al., 2001; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002). 
  2. The dorsomedial PFC (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex) is involved in monitoring cognitive conflict in object-level processors (Botvinick et al., 1999, 2004).

The failure to negate the "biased" information (e.g., delusions) after detection

  1. The dorsolateral PFC facilitates the manipulation of information in working memory by updating and rerouting information processing (Shimamura, 2000; Simons & Spiers, 2003).

One faulty department that might have been the trigger for all my hospitalization with its impact even stronger towards hospitalization... ventromedial PFC... because... kaput ventromedial PFC--> Excessive motional arousal-->tying up the brain capacity-->interfering with the function of other PFC regions-->bye bye the monitoring and control of psychotic symptoms-->into the Club Meds I go.

  1. [T]he ventromedial PFC enables the same kind of monitoring and control as other PFC regions, only it regulates affective processes rather than cognitive processes.

The feeling of knowing is also addressed in this paper... intuitively I would say... there is something about FOK... whether you believe it or not...

Friday, May 24, 2013

Nelson & Narens (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework and some new findings.

Nelson, T.O. & Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework and some new findings. In G.H. Bower (Ed). The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125-173. New York: Academic Press

A: The abstract principles of metacognition

(The following three principles are the exact quotes)
  1. Principle 1: The cognitive processes are split into two or more specifically interrelated levels: the meta-level and the object-level.
  2. Principle 2: The meta-level contains a dynamic model of the object-level.
  3. Principle 3: There are two dominance relations, called "control" and "monitoring," which are defined in terms of the direction of the flow of information between the meta-level and the object-level. This distinction in the direction of flow of information is analogous to that in a telephone handset.
This diagram in Nelson and Narens (1990) (p. 126) shows the theoretical mechanism consisting of the meta-level and the object-level and their relations.  
This diagram above shows a theoretical mechanism consisting of the meta-level (e.g., metacognition) and the object-level (e.g., cognition).

The authors used the telephone handset analogy to explain the information flow between the meta and the object levels.  The way I interpret it is... its' sort of like the relations between Gordon Ramsey and the chefs in Hell's Kitchen (if not simply the chefs and their dishes)... with what goes on in your head the equivalent of "Hells Kitechen." (At least mine).  (Could cook something up with my psychosis though might as well go directly with cooking...)

The role of Gordon Ramsey is equivalent to your metacognition and the role of the chefs, cognition.  What the chefs cook up are like the cognitive outcome and how they do the cooking, the cognitive processes.  As the chefs are busy cooking down there, Ramsey (meta-level) gets information about what is going on with the chefs (object-level)--this is the monitoring process.  After Ramsey (meta-level) processes the information he gathers, he (metal-level) goes on yelling at these chefs (object-level) and tells them (object-level) what to do, and the chefs go back on to cook following the directions of Ramsey... this is what the control relation is about.

It might be an even better analogies if there are multiple people with a role similar to that of Gordon Ramsey... since some theories believe that how metacognition works in the brain is more or less like the notion of cloud computing... different regions associated with different metacognitive roles.

Also, one thing I kept on hearing Ramsey yelled out loud was... "Out! Out! Out!" Well, maybe your metacognition doesn't do it... mine surely does it on a daily basis... 

1. Control

The notion behind control is that the meta-level modifies the object-level... its state or process... and contribute to actions at the object-level: 1. to initiate and action, 2. to continue an action, or 3. to terminate an action.

2. Monitoring

The basic notion behind monitoring is that the meta-level is informed by the object-level... and result in the change in the model the meta-level has on the situation, including "no change" (i.e., Gorgon Ramsey's view of how the kitchen is running).  

Interestingly, as per Nelson and Naren (1990), "the opposite does not occur, i.e., the object-level has no model of the meta-level."  Don't think I really understand it... and thus... don't have the audacity to agree or disagree... Yet, in the process of working on the psychotic model of how my psychotic mind works... including at the metacognitive level, aim I not building up a cognitive model (object-level) of my metacognition (meta-level)? 8-O

Donno, maybe I haven't quite gotta the notion the authors were trying to convey or my example might be buggy and I am too blind to see it.

3.  Role of subjective reports about introspection for inferences about monitoring

Following are some notions the authors mentioned about the methodological issues they encountered.
  1. The measurement issue on introspective reports--the assumption behind using telescopes to observe and that when studying the use of telescopes as an instrument.  Were my head the equivalent of a telescope, I have no doubt doubting the validity of its outputs and distortions.  lol
  2. Views on introspective reports: descriptions of internal processes (as per the Structuralist's view) vs. data to be explained.  
  3. "A system that monitors itself (even imperfectly) may use its own introspections as input to alter the system's behavior."  I am in total agreement with this notion... the basic assumption of monitoring our psychotic mind with our disordered thinking.
  4. Perception could be conceptualized as sensation plus inference... the coexistence of accuracy and distortion--true value and error.  Apparently, even the normal have to deal with the error term...

B. The monitoring and control of human memory

This diagram in Nelson and Narens (1990) (p. 129) shows examples of monitoring and control tasks at different stages of learning.
The way I see it... correct or not... what's between monitoring and control is the processes occurring at the cognitive or object level... for the perspective of information processing theory... the middle section looks almost like the working memory (WM).  When discussing the theoretical framework represented by the above model, the authors recommended the context of student studying for an exam to the readers. 

Among all, one thing that differentiates between the model of Flavell (1979) and this one (Nelson & Narens, 1990) is that Nelson and Narens broke it down further... the processes at the meta-level and object-level (e.g., WM) and subdivided monitoring into ease of learning, judgments of knowing and feeling of knowing.

Most of the things the authors discussed are captured in the above diagram.  In the following section, I will only mention the notions of interest to me.  

1. Acquisition stage: In advance of learning

a. Determining one's goal: the person's norm of study

  1. A person's theory of retention is used to modulate how well the content has to be mastered in order for it to be remembered and recalled in the retention tasks.
  2. The norm of study is the product of an individual's theory of retention... the mastery the individual believes he or she should obtained during the acquisition phase.

b. Formulating a plan to attain the norm of study

Retrospective monitory vs. Protrospective monitoring in the context of seeing airplanes in the sky:
  • Retrospective monitoring (judgments of past performance): How well did I do the last time I saw an airplane flying in the sky?
  • Protrospective monitoring (judgments about subsequent performance): How well might I fare the next time I see an airplane flying in the sky?
The authors further subdivided protrospective monitoring into three categories:
  1. 1. Ease-of-learning (EOL): occurring in advance of acquisition.
  2. 2. Judgments of learning (JOL): occurring during or after acquisition to predict future performance on currently recallable items
  3. 3. Feeling of knowing (FOK): occuring during or after acquisition about whether a currently nonrecallable item is known and/or will be remembered in a subsequent test
Research found that EOL, JOL, and FOK are not highly correlated... meaning they measure different things... or these judgments might measure different aspects of memory with the structure underlying these judgments multidimensional.  

c. Ease of learning judgments.

The outcome of EOL can affect the amount of time allocated to study.

d. A Prior Choice of Processing judgments

After EOL, the person decides the kinds of processing to use on the study item.

e. Initial plan for the allocation of study time

Monitoring: this is a harder item to learn=>control: allocate more time
This diagram in Nelson and Narens (1990) (p. 132)
This is the diagram of my dream... since there's nothing new under the sun... I know I can found someone who has already gotten a model like this out... the separation of cognition and metacognition.  In this diagram, the upper portion (theoretical) represents metacognition while the lower portion, the processing in the working memory or cognitive level.

2. Acquisition stage: the ongoing learner

Following is the flowchart showing how learning works... at the metacognitive level and it's relation with the cognitive level.  One thing I love most that table titled metacognitive library, which, according to Flavell (1979) is rightfully encoded in LTM.  Why is this notion important? What is the likelihood that a certain strategy will be effective in intervening  a certain type of psychotic scenario?

This diagram in Nelson and Narens (1990) (p. 133)

Some processing involved in the above cycle...

a. Feeling of knowing for currently nonrecallable items.
FOK is linked to time allocation
b. Judgments of learning for currently recallable items:
Are you making judgments of future performance based on monitoring of information in the WM or long term memory?  Delayed recall might resolve this issue.
c. Updating the allocation of study time during a particular study trial of an item.
People study till the JOL for the item reach the norm of study though their judgments might be really off from the reality. Motivation might be a confounding factor.
d. Termination of study.
When JOL reaches the norm of study, study is terminated.

3. Retention stage

The maintenance of previously acquired knowledge might involve similar process as in the acquisition stage with the following additions:
  1. 1. discrepancy between the desired degree of mastery and the assessed degree of mastery
  2. 2. FOK-directed maintenance work

4. Retrieval stage: Termination

The distinction between self-directed and non-self-directed retrieval... Nelson and Narens focused on self-directed retrieval: the search itself and setting up the cues to initiate the search.  The following is the flowchart for the retrieval stage.

This diagram in Nelson and Narens (1990) (p. 136)

a. Quick initiation/termination of retrieval.

Possibly FOK-based with a latency far shorter than that for an actual recall. 
There is something very interesting about the notion of quick initiation and FOK... like... I know that feeling... can't give you the exact reason why but I think it's delusional... The FOK arrives before the identification.

b. Placement of retrieval termination:

The termination happens when someone is no longer willing to continue of the FOK no longer exceed the threshold of claiming to know the non-retrieved items. 

The good thing about my lack of creativity is that I seemed to have oversaturated the kinds of delusions my head is capable of creating... thus, not too many records for the head to search through when trying to answer the question of whether the observed event fit the profile of past delusions or not.  Given the limited number of search my head has to perform, and, I suspect, more sophisticated search algorithm it operates on as a result of being a more experienced psychotic (than in my younger years) plus my false-positive-allowed policy, there's gotta be an extremely high threshold for nonretrieved items.  Also, in the context of psychosis, premature termination might be something really risky... untreated delusions etc can become the weakest link my my head's security.

5. Retrieval Stage: Output of response.

People's threshold for outputting the retrieved answer might be affected by factors such as "cost vs. rewards.

6 Retrieval stage: Confidence judgments after recall

Commission error vs. omission error

After the description of the model, the authors went on discussion some issues concerning the methodology and relevant findings for their research.  Since my main interest is in the model itself, I will only mention the points of relevance to me.

1. Amount of information deposited in long-term memory is important for metacognitive monitoring. (That's why I went back to the psychiatric ward during the second full-blown episode.

a. Our early experiment
The FOK results
  1. Reliability: People are consistent in their FOK judgments
  2. Validity: The consistent judgments of people are not all that useful in predicting the outcome of future performance
b. Effect of degree of learning on retention interval on FOK accuracy
In order to perform monitoring, you need to have enough beef registered in the LTM.
With the retention rate, it looks like you have to lit it sit for some time to get the correct accessment.

c. Our first published experiment on metamemory
The degree of learning is important to FOK accuracy.  (Nelson, Leonesio, Shimamura, Landwehr & Narens, 1982)

d. Mechanisms for the overlearning effects on metacognitive accuracy:
  1. Metacognitive judgments attempt to discriminate between items.  Higher accuracy in discriminating items when the differences between the items increase
  2. Overlearning might enhance the stability of retention and increase the differences between items.
e. Empirical support for the item-discrimination mechanism
People are reasonably fine as measuring devices but their have limits in their ability to differentiate between objects.  The more different the item, the more likely for the metacognitive discrimination to be valid. Whether items could be validly discriminated is dependent on the person's ability to monitor and the degree of differences between items (difficulty level).

2. FOK may be perfectly valid at tapping a larger number of aspects of LTM but the accuracy of FOK for predicting criterion performance may nevertheless be imperfect.

This is an interesting one... in the context of psychosis, there is this FOK... the sense that the observation is delusional.  In reality, I treat all observations with uncertain intents as delusional--false positive allowed. For practical purposes, it doesn't have to be perfect... as long as no false negative.

FOK dependent on what's in LTM rather than in WM or unconscious memory.

3. Privileged access

a. Judge/observer experiments
People's prediction might benefit from the idiosyncratic information at their disposal during retrieval.
b. Normative predictions vs. the individual's own FOK prediction.
People's FOK predictions on their own subsequent performance on currently nonrecallable items  is better than the normative FOK prediction derived from the average prediction.  But individual's FOK predictions are worse than predictions derived from the normative probability of correct recall.  It has been found that the accuracy of people's FOK prediction is higher when given the normative probability of recall...Unfortunately, people seems to be poor at intuiting the normative probability of recall on items that can not recall.

4. Some factors underlying people's FOK judgments (vs. accuracy)

a. Overlearning affects not only FOK accuracy but als the magnitude of FOK.
b. Overlearning study trials vs. overlearning test trials.
Both the study trials and test trials affect the magnitude of subsequent FOK.
c. Actual overlearning vs. claimed overlearning.
Most effects of overlearning on FOK seemed to be mediated by people's belief about whether the items have been overlearned... as opposed to an "automatic" effect of overlearning.
The no-Magic Hypothesis for how FOK should be conceptualized: the person 1). considers particular recallable properties of the to-be-retrieved items) in conjunction with 2). rules about how the properties are related to the subsequent criterion performance that the person is trying to predict.

According to non-magic hypothesis, "FOK does not directly monitor a given unrecalled item in memory, but rather the FOK monitors recallable aspects related to that item, such as the item's acquisition history or partial/related recalled components."

5. Learning-to-learn effect for FOK judgment?

Can FOK accuracy be improved by sheer practice on FOK judgments? It doesn't matter whether you provide feedback or not on their FOK judgments... the practice effect is small shall it ever occur.

6. Relation between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control during acquisition: The allocation of self-paced study time.

The allocation of study time is also mediated by people's EOL and FOK in addition to a response to item difficulty.
If people believe that they have learned things well, it's useless to give them more time to learn.

7. Relation between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control during retrieval: termination of memory searching.

a. Role of "preliminary FOK judgments" prior to searching for an answer.
  1. Single-counter FOK hypothesis: one FOK component that only taps the presence of information in memory
  2. Dual-counter FOK hypothesis: tapping both the presence and absence of information in memory.
This diagram is in Nelson and Narens (1990) (p. 164)
Results indicated in the above diagram confirms the dual-counter hypothesis.

b. Relation between ongoing FOK and the latency of recall errors.
The substantial correlation between FOK and the latency of omission errors indicates that people's FOK affects whether the overall retrieval stage with be continued or terminated. However, the correlation between FOK and the latency of commission errors is nil for general-information items.  The difference could be considered as the manifestation of the differential mechanism involved as shown in figure 5 above.

c. Relation between metacognitive confidence judgments and the latency of recall.
While the latency of recall affects the confidence of judgment, distance between the the curves showed that something else is affecting people's confidence.  

This diagram is in Nelson and Narens (1990) (p. 167)

Love how the authors put it... "We do not yet know what that something is, but future research should attempt to isolate and identify it."

One thing I found most interesting is the notion of feeling of knowing (FOK)... 

A lot of times, this is how delusions manifest themselves... no hallucination and anything else attached... simply the FOK dropping by and landing on the working memory... like... I knew the the apocalypse was coming again, I know they are checking out everything I do including my internal blog, I know they are talking about this blurb I am working on now, or I know some other things a like out of no where that I have never known and maybe in contexts I have never been in.  How do I know it?  I could feel it... the gut feeling... I just know it, believe it. (Of course, this FOK I have spoken of up to this point might not be the FOK Nelson & Narens (1990 ) were talking about... unless... it's about one of the multiple manifestations of the same principle?  Donno.)  

Then, I would have the FOK about the above FOK... something fishy there... feels like delusions... Even before I have to explicate to myself which part of the scenario seems delusional, I intervene by means such as what Ramsey said to some chefs... "Out! Out! Out!"

So I came across the notion of FOK and the associated research findings... as well as the no-magic hypothesis... as summarized above... Then, I thought... a good way of conceptualizing the fishy kind of FOK... it surely could be true that, after being delusional for over a decade, I must have enough delusions encoded in my LTM to boost up the accuracy rate of my FOK.  My head might have, somehow, figured out the attributes of delusional dasein, which, theoretically, is the basis of how FOK works... in spite of my inability to have it articulated.  If this is really how it works, it would be really beneficial for my head since the last thing I need is to constantly access my memories of psychosis... not to mention that the constant access might strengthen the path towards them and make them easily activated.

At the same time, since I treat all observations with uncertain intents as symptomatic... allowing for false positive, I don't need the FOK to be accurate in all perspectives... as long as no false negative.

Tuesday, May 14, 2013

Flavell (1979) Metacognition and cognitive monitory--In Ratprincess' eyes

Flavell's definition of Metacognition: knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena.  Metacognition plays an important role in tasks like language acquisition and problem solving.  The notion of metacogntion is applied in areas such as cognitive behavior modification (CBT?)

Flavell's model of cognitive monitoring

Flavell considered cognitive monitoring is done through the actions and interactions of four classes of phenomena: a) metacognitive knowledge, b) metacognitive experiences, c) goals/tasks, and d) actions/strategies.  Metacognitive knowledge and experiences are considered to differ from cognitive knowledge and experiences in the nature and contents--but not in the form or quality.

Metacognitive knowledge:

  1. Flavell's definition: The segment of knowledge that has to do with people as cognitive creatures and with their cognitive tasks, goals, actions, and experiences.
  2. Ex. I have disordered thinking and my reality might not be shared by the others.

Metacognitive experiences:

  1. Flavell's definition: Any conscious cognitive or affective experiences that accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise.
  2. Ex. Before Valentine's Day, 2008, I had the metacognitive knowledge that my psychotic symptoms were really bad but I failed to observe enough symptoms to match up with my expectations.


  1. Flavell's definition: The objectives of a cognitive enterprise.
  2. Ex.  Detect delusions.


  1. Flavell's definition: The cognition or other behaviors employed to achieve the goals/tasks.
  2. Ex.  Match observations with established corpus of contents, behavioral patterns, and impacts of delusions.

Metacognitive knowledge

Flavell (1979) considered metacognitive knowledge to consist of "knowledge or beliefs about what factors or variables act and interact in what ways to affect the course and outcome of cognitive enterprise."  He also classified these factors into three major categories--person, task, and strategy.


  1. Intraindividual differences:  I can handle my head better with the tactics than without.  
  2. Interindividual differences:  The tactics working for me might not be appropriate for the others
  3. Universals of cognition:  There are different degrees of proficiency we can achieve in the different learning tasks--the application of the tactics.  Sometimes it might be difficult for us to detect our defects and control it with the workarounds.  You also have the insight that you might not be able to perform later what you can able to perform now and vice versa.


  1. The nature of information:  The nature of information (e.g., contaminated by psychotic symptoms) might make it difficult to warrant "accurate" (i.e., align with the reality shared by the others) judgments about the "world." 
  2. Task demands and goals:It's harder for me to engage in higher-order cognitive processing without invoking the symptoms.


It's possible to devise strategies that can be effective to achieving the goal of neutralizing and negating delusional notions--such as airplane flying in the sky and flight 1549.
"Metacognitive knowledge is not fundamentally different from other knowledge stored in long-term memory."  As a result, it can be retrieved through either deliberate conscious search (e.g., the search for a strategy) or be done unintentional and automatically.

Metacognitive knowledge can be...
  1. Inaccurate: I allow for false positive... all observations with uncertain intents are classified as symptomatic.
  2. Fail to be activated: You can't detect delusions that's already classified by your head as the reality shared by the others.
  3. Fail to have much or any influence when activated: The general awareness that I am delusional itself sometimes doesn't stop the delusion to have impacts on me.
  4. Can fail to have a beneficial or adaptive effect when influential: When the symptoms were bad back in the era of origami, around the time when Dr. Strauss used to come visit me, origami worked for certain times and the focus on origami calmed my head down after getting overheated.  Then, at some time, when the symptoms were more on the wildside again, origami surely calmed the head down but, when concentrated on papge folding, the voices became even more prominent since all's quite except for the voices.  Though... I did pull it through...
Metacognitive knowledge can lead people to "select, evaluate, revise, and abandon cognitive tasks, goals, and strategies in light of their relationship with one another and with your own abilities and interests with respect to that enterprise."

For the perspective of the delusional enterprise, there is something interesting about the notion of abandoning cognitive tasks, goals, and strategies.  So, for instance, when doing literature review now, I would hear people say things like I am a copycat...  instead of making it a goal to figure out how they get the up-to-date information on what I had just done and find the strategies to intervene accordingly and how they are wrong... as a delusion, upon the observation, I have to abandon that default task and shift to the task of negating the belief in formation to prevent the further build up of the delusional system and conspiracy theory.

Metacognitive experiences

"Many metacognitive experiences have to do with where you are in an enterprise and what sort of progress you are making or are likely to make."
How psychotic am I today in comparison to, say, one week ago before the dosage change with the enterprise being the psychotic enterprise.  This sentence speaks for the inconnectedness between metacognitive knowledge and experiences since how I feel involves the comparison of my metacognitive knowledge about my state of being a week ago and the new metacognitive knowledge derived through my recent experiences.

Metacognitive experiences are especially likely to take place in situations that requires "careful, highly conscious thinking"... such as as when decisions and actions are both weighty and risky, and where there is absence of high affective arousal or other inhibiting factors (e.g., Langer, 1978).
The decisions I make and actions I take in handling my psychotic symptoms are surely weighty and risky.  History has taught me the lesson of one step wrong... whole path wrong.  That should be weighty and risky enough.
Metacognitive experiences and effects on cognitive goals/tasks, actions/strategies, and metacognitive knowledge
  • Metacognitive experiences can lead you to establish new goals and to revise or abandon old ones.
  1. Instead of running my head on where the surveillance devices are, change the goal to getting better in using workarounds to negate and neutralize the symptomatic observations
  • Metacognitive experiences can affect your metacognitive knowledge base by adding to it, deleting from it, or revising it... the Piagetian notion of assimilation and accommodation.
  1. This is why I went direct into the cuckoo's nest the second time.  I had insufficient metacognitive knowledge base on tasks such as symptom detection, which are derived through metacognitive experiences.
  • Metacognitive experiences can activate cognitive or metacognitive goals.  The purpose of cognitive strategies are to make cognitive process and that for the metacognitive strategies is to monitor the progress.
  1. Cognitive goals and strategies: I sense my defects arising, it activates the retrieval of appropriate intervening strategies... such as airplane flying by... flight 1549.  The workarounds are the cognitive strategies aim at stopping the buildup of my delusional system.
  2. Metacognitive goals and strategies: Now I applied the cognitive strategy to intervene, the metacognitive goal I have is to assess the level of impact the intervention has, how well the cognitive strategy works, how I can improve upon the intervention, what else can be done (thereby generating another metacognitive experience)
However, the effects might not be as clear-cut.  For instance, the monitoring of the effects of my cognitive goal might also result in the improvement.

At the same time, as per Flavell, the store of metacognitive knowledge might contain both cognitive and metacognitive knowledge.  

Developmental and educational implications

A differentiation process, Children's development in the notion of understanding--the universal
  1. Understanding or not understanding
  2. The level of understanding
  3. The difficulties involved in making accurate assessments and associating factors (e.g., intense affect, mental or physical illness.)
Questions posed by Flavell:
How much good does cognitive monitoring actually do us in various types of cognitive enterprise?
Some good... in the psychotic cognitive enterprise...
Might it not even do more harm than good, especially if used in excessive or nonselectively?
Excellent question, that's why the identification of tactics to use our head in more selective fashion so that we don't overheat it.
Think of the feckless obsessive, paralyzed by incessant critical evaluation of his own judgments and decision?
Interesting notions here... In reality, delusionals are by default floating in a sea of critical evaluations on their judgments and decision.  This is why, since we are already doing it in our everyday life, might as well do it in a way--away from harm's way.  
Flavell's personal opinion: Training on metacognition is possible.  For instance, Brown, Campione and Barcly  trained children with learning challenges to use self-testing strategies on certain tasks.  A year later, when these kids were tested on the same tasks again, not only were they able to applied the strategies they were taught, some even modified the strategies to make them more effective.

"In many real-life situation, the monitoring problem is not to determine how well you understand what a message means but to determine how much you ought to believe it or do what it says to do."

Absolutely the real life statements for psychotics... shall I believe in my delusions or shall I do what my hallucinations tell me to do?  Shall I cut myself to save some blood because they were going to swap the sample (my second full-blown episode)?  For psychotics, we need to learn as per the words of Flavell "how much you ought to believe it or do what it says to do"--what you see, what you hear, and what you think.  When defects are detected, your search for the most pertinent cognitive strategies to intervene, and further assess how well your intervention achieved the cognitive goal of stopping the build up of the delusional system.