Disclaimer: English Kinda Thing

The sole purpose of the "English Kinda Thing" is to document my attempts to correct my own mistakes in standard English usage and to share the resources I find. In no way do I attempt to teach nobody English through these blurbs--just as I intend not to teach nobody to be a neurotic and psychotic handicap in Ratology Reloaded or Down with Meds! :-)

Sunday, May 4, 2014

Hegel (1998). Preface (A. V. Miller, Trans.) Phenomenology of Spirit

Following are some quotes that resonate with me in the Preface of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Please note that these are only quotes that resonate with me during the reading process and doesn't represent the author's concluding thesis.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1998). Preface (A. V. Miller, Trans.) Phenomenology of Spirit (pp. 1-45): Motilal Banarsidass.

"To judge a thing that has substance and solid worth is quite easy, to comprehend it is much harder, and to blend judgement and comprehension in a definitive description is the hardest thing of all." (p. 3)

"The power of Spirit is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in its exposition." (p. 6)
So established the notion of limited my words.

"When we wish to see an oak with its massive trunk and spreading branches and foliage, we are not content to be shown an acorn instead." (p. 7)
Guess there is an legit reason why I went all the way into the psychiatric ward on Valentine's Day, 2008.

"As for content ... [they] appropriate a lot of already familiar and well-ordered material; by focusing on rare and exotic instance they gave the impression that they have hold of everything else which scientific knowledge had already embraced in its scope, and that they are also in command of such material as is as yet unordered.   It thus appears that everything has been subjected to the absolute Idea, which therefore seems to be cognized in everything and to have matured into an expanded science." (P. 8)

"The Idea, which is of course true enough on its own account, remains in effect always in its primitive condition, if its development involves nothing more than this sort of repetition of the same formula .... [This] is no more than the fulfillment of what is needed, i.e. a self-originating, self differentiating wealth of shapes, than any arbitrary insights into the content. Rather it is a monochromatic formalism which only arrives at the differentiation of its material since this has been already provided and is by now familiar." (P. 8-9)
This this why it's the high time for my book to stop since I am simply reading things the same way.

"[This] formalism maintains that such monotorny and abstract universality are the Absolute, and we are assured that dissatisfaction with it indicates the inability to master the absolute standpoint and to keep hold of it." (p. 9)
For me, it's simply, given the nature of redundant notions, what's the point of seeing more of my own viewpoint. Over-saturated already.

"Dealing with something from the perspective of the Absolute consists merely in declaring that, although one has been speaking of it just now as something definite, yet in the Absolute, the A=A, there is nothing of the kind, for there all is one. To pit this single insight, that in the Absolute everything is the same, against the full body of articulated cognition, which at least seeks and demands such fulfillment, to palm off its Absolute as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black--this is cognition naively reduced to vacuity." (P. 9)
With all due respect, Mr. Hegel, this is why I am reading this preface of yours in this book, where you stated "the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black."
Absolutely or not... over-saturated still. Make no mistake--it's a good thing I have over-saturated what I can afford though it's the reality that I have over-saturated what I can afford.

"[a] so-called basic proposition or principle of philosophy, if true, is also false, just because it is only a principle. It is, therefore, easy to refute it. The refutation consists in pointing out its defect; and it is defective because it is only the universal or principle, is only the beginning. If the refutation is thorough, it is derived and developed from the principle itself .... The refutation would, therefore, properly consist in the further development of the principle, and in thus remedying the defectiveness...." (p. 13)
Thanks, Mr. Hegel. Albeit with the defective nature of the model in my 11-copy book and although nothing universal since applicable to me's, myselves, and I's, my crazy talk does seem to serve some purpose.

"Consciousness knows and comprehends only what falls within its experience; for what is contained in this is nothing but spiritual substance and this, too, as object of the self." (p. 21)
More argument to support my argument that the tactics and model is for me's, myselves, and I's only.

"Truth is its own self-movement, whereas the method just described is the mode of cognition that remains external to its material." (p. 28)
Good point to justify why after all these years, I still don't know Jack about psychosis--since the truth, as per my understanding so far, is but hanging out there. A good excuse, blame it on the (scientific) method Mr. Hegel had described? 8-O

"It is for this reason unnecessary to clothe the content in an external [logical] formalism; the content is in its very nature the transition into such formalism, but a formalism which ceases to be external, since the form is the innate development of the concrete content itself." (p. 34-35)
This is why I have such difficulties editing my own writing in the Ratology domain. To be honest, I think all texts should simply be unedited... like if anyone wants to read DWM, he or she should simply go to the original source-unabridged and unedited.

Thursday, May 1, 2014

Stanovich (2009) Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory?

Stanovich, K. E. (2009). Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory? In two minds: Dual processes and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
"Evolutionarily adaptive behavior is not the same as rational behavior." (p. 55)
"Definitions of rationality must be kept consistent with the entity whose optimization is at issue. In order to maintain this consistency, the different "interest" of the replicators and the vehicle must be explicitly recognized." (p. 56)
Although I don't know too much about evolutionary psychology, these quotes do appeal to me because the tactics and the S2 belief system I spoke of in my psychotic model surely might not be considered evolutionarily adaptive. Yet, since the optimization of this entity is indicated by kicking at large, the walk I talked does seem rational to myself given that I haven't gone back to the psychiatric ward since 2008.  I guess, what adaptive and rational means is surely dependent on the context.

"Evans ... and Stanovich ... have both argued that although many theorists use terms such as System 1 or heuristic system as if they were talking about a singular system, this is really a misnomer .... In actuality, the term used should be plural because it refers to a set of systems in the brain that operate autonomously in response to their own triggering stimuli, and are not under the control of the analytic processing system. I thus have suggested the acronym TASS (standing for The Autonomous Set Systems) to describe what is in actuality a heterogeneous set." (p. 56)
"Also, TASS contains many rules, stimulus discriminations, and decision-making principles that have been practiced to automaticity." (p. 57)
What this means to me is that, it seems kosher to consider the tactics as something under System 1 or TASS.

"This learned information can be just as much a threat to rational behavior--that is, just as in need of override by System 2--as are evolutionary modules that fire inappropriately in a modern environment." (p. 57)

p. 58

"It is proposed that variation in fluid intelligence ... largely indexes individual differences in the efficiency of processing of the algorithmic mind. In contrast, thinking dispositions index individual differences at the intentional level--that is, in the reflective mind." (p. 59)

"... there are many psychiatric disorders (particularly those such as delusions) which implicate intentional-level functioning (that is, functioning in what I here call the reflective mind). (p. 59)

"Many of the symptoms of psychiatric disorder involve impairments of rationality--and consequently that the norms of rationality must be taken to play a vital role in the understanding of psychiatric disorder." (p. 59)
Why did I pace in shorts and sandals on Broadway after a snowstorm? I had a good reason and it was absolutely rational except my rationale is none the normal can conceive of. 8-O lol

"To be rational, an organism must have well calibrated beliefs (reflective level) and must act appropriately on those beliefs to achieve goals (reflective level). The organism must, of course, have the algorithmic-level machinery that enables it to carry out the actions and to process the environment in a way that enables the correct beliefs to be fixed and the correct actions to be taken." (p. 59)
An interesting way to see how the erosion of my S2 theory takes place.

"Decoupling processes enable one to distance oneself from representations of the world so that they can be reflected upon and potentially improved. The use of metarepresentational abilities in such a program of cognitive reform would be an example of what has been termed the quest for broad rationality ...." (p. 63)
Having spoken so many a time throughout the years about how life seems to be galaxies away as a result of medication .... Come to think of it... the medication does seem to do a mean job in the decoupling thing except, in that state, the head would be too atama concrete to do any reflection. 8-O lol sigh
"... the idea of humans as cognitive misers .... Krueger and Funder (2004) characterize the cognitive miser assumption as one that emphasizes "limited mental resources, reliance on irrelevant cues, and the difficulties of effortful correction (pp. 316-7). More humorously, Hall (2001) has said that 'the rule that human being seem to follow is to engage the brain only when all else fails--and usually not even then'." (p. 69).
"humans will find any way they can to ease the cognitive load and process less information." (p. 69) 
Surely me.  This is why I obey the traffic rules.  Not even need to use my head to figure out whether it's jaywalk-able. Also why I don't switch beyond psychotic and antipsychotic cognition.

"The reflective mind not only accesses general knowledge structures but importantly, accesses the person's opinions, beliefs, and reflectively acquired goal structure .... The algorithmic mind access micro-strategies for cognitive operations and production system rules for sequencing behaviors and thoughts.  Finally, the autonomous mind access not only evolutionarily-compiled encapsulated knowledge bases, but also retrieves information that has become tightly compiled due to overlearning and practice." (p. 71)
"The rules, procedures, and strategies that can be retrieved by the analytic system (the algorithmic and reflective mind) and used to transform decoupled representations have been referred to as mindware .... If, in fact, the relevant mindware is not available because it has not been learned, then we have a case of missing mindware rather than a TASS-override failure." (p. 71)
Sounds like the generative issue I spoke of which might or might not go into the model.
"If, in fact, the mindware is not available because it has not been learned or at least not learned to the requisite level to sustain override, then I am suggesting in this taxonomy that we call this not override failure but instead a mindware gap." (p. 73)
 "In fact, some acquired mindware can be the direct cause of irrational actions that thwart our goals.  Such effect thus define another category in the taxonomy of cognitive failure: contaminated mindware." (p. 73)
The whole coping thing in the domain of psychosis is about containing the level of contamination in the mindware.

p. 74

P. 78
p. 79