Stanovich, K. E. (2009). Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory? In two minds: Dual processes and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
"Evolutionarily adaptive behavior is not the same as rational behavior." (p. 55)
"Definitions of rationality must be kept consistent with the entity whose optimization is at issue. In order to maintain this consistency, the different "interest" of the replicators and the vehicle must be explicitly recognized." (p. 56)
Although I don't know too much about evolutionary psychology, these quotes do appeal to me because
the tactics and the S2 belief system I spoke of in my psychotic model surely might not be considered evolutionarily adaptive. Yet, since the optimization of this entity is indicated by kicking at large, the walk I talked does seem rational to myself given that I haven't gone back to the psychiatric ward since 2008. I guess, what adaptive and rational means is surely dependent on the context.
"Evans ... and Stanovich ... have both argued that although many theorists use terms such as System 1 or heuristic system as if they were talking about a singular system, this is really a misnomer .... In actuality, the term used should be plural because it refers to a set of systems in the brain that operate autonomously in response to their own triggering stimuli, and are not under the control of the analytic processing system. I thus have suggested the acronym TASS (standing for The Autonomous Set Systems) to describe what is in actuality a heterogeneous set." (p. 56)
"Also, TASS contains many rules, stimulus discriminations, and decision-making principles that have been practiced to automaticity." (p. 57)
What this means to me is that, it seems kosher to consider the tactics as something under System 1 or TASS.
"This learned information can be just as much a threat to rational behavior--that is, just as in need of override by System 2--as are evolutionary modules that fire inappropriately in a modern environment." (p. 57)
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| p. 58 |
"It is proposed that variation in fluid intelligence ... largely indexes individual differences in the efficiency of processing of the algorithmic mind. In contrast, thinking dispositions index individual differences at the intentional level--that is, in the reflective mind." (p. 59)
"... there are many psychiatric disorders (particularly those such as delusions) which implicate intentional-level functioning (that is, functioning in what I here call the reflective mind). (p. 59)
"Many of the symptoms of psychiatric disorder involve impairments of rationality--and consequently that the norms of rationality must be taken to play a vital role in the understanding of psychiatric disorder." (p. 59)
Why did I pace in shorts and sandals on Broadway after a snowstorm? I had a good reason and it was absolutely rational except my rationale is none the normal can conceive of. 8-O lol
"To be rational, an organism must have well calibrated beliefs (reflective level) and must act appropriately on those beliefs to achieve goals (reflective level). The organism must, of course, have the algorithmic-level machinery that enables it to carry out the actions and to process the environment in a way that enables the correct beliefs to be fixed and the correct actions to be taken." (p. 59)
An interesting way to see how the erosion of my S2 theory takes place.
"Decoupling processes enable one to distance oneself from representations of the world so that they can be reflected upon and potentially improved. The use of metarepresentational abilities in such a program of cognitive reform would be an example of what has been termed the quest for broad rationality ...." (p. 63)
Having spoken so many a time throughout the years about how life seems to be galaxies away as a result of medication .... Come to think of it... the medication does seem to do a mean job in the decoupling thing except, in that state, the head would be too atama concrete to do any reflection. 8-O lol sigh
"... the idea of humans as cognitive misers .... Krueger and Funder (2004) characterize the cognitive miser assumption as one that emphasizes "limited mental resources, reliance on irrelevant cues, and the difficulties of effortful correction (pp. 316-7). More humorously, Hall (2001) has said that 'the rule that human being seem to follow is to engage the brain only when all else fails--and usually not even then'." (p. 69).
"humans will find any way they can to ease the cognitive load and process less information." (p. 69)
Surely me. This is why I obey the traffic rules. Not even need to use my head to figure out whether it's jaywalk-able. Also why I don't switch beyond psychotic and antipsychotic cognition.
"The reflective mind not only accesses general knowledge structures but importantly, accesses the person's opinions, beliefs, and reflectively acquired goal structure .... The algorithmic mind access micro-strategies for cognitive operations and production system rules for sequencing behaviors and thoughts. Finally, the autonomous mind access not only evolutionarily-compiled encapsulated knowledge bases, but also retrieves information that has become tightly compiled due to overlearning and practice." (p. 71)
"The rules, procedures, and strategies that can be retrieved by the analytic system (the algorithmic and reflective mind) and used to transform decoupled representations have been referred to as mindware .... If, in fact, the relevant mindware is not available because it has not been learned, then we have a case of missing mindware rather than a TASS-override failure." (p. 71)
Sounds like the generative issue I spoke of which might or might not go into the model.
"If, in fact, the mindware is not available because it has not been learned or at least not learned to the requisite level to sustain override, then I am suggesting in this taxonomy that we call this not override failure but instead a mindware gap." (p. 73)
"In fact, some acquired mindware can be the direct cause of irrational actions that thwart our goals. Such effect thus define another category in the taxonomy of cognitive failure: contaminated mindware." (p. 73)
The whole coping thing in the domain of psychosis is about containing the level of contamination in the mindware.
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| p. 74 |
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| P. 78 |
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| p. 79 |
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