Thompson (2009). Dual-process theories: A metacognitive perspective.

Although I would love to find my intuitive mumbo jumbos to align perfectly with expert's notions, I have to say that some of my mumbo jumbos don't quite go hand in hand with some quotes I found in Dr. Thompson's article.  The good thing is that since the psychotic model I built is but a layperson's model about my psychotic head, it gives me a good excuse to make my own interpretation and acknowledge how a model about how deviated I am from the normal might deviate from different viewpoints (I hope). 8-X

The good thing about this article and the book is that it contains a combination of views, which makes me feel not so insecure to the extent that I will take the entire model out. 8-O lol

Thompson, V. A. (2009). Dual-process theories: A metacognitive perspective. In two minds: Dual processes and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

"I develop the argument that the outcome of a given reasoning attempt is determined not only by the content of the information that is retrieved by S1 and analyzed by S2, but also by a second-order judgment." (p. 171)

The author endorsed the importance of the second-order principle, which address a question brought up by Chi.

 "I referred to metacognitive judgments as second-order judgments, that is, as judgments about judgments." (p. 186)

" Specifically, a JOR is a judgment about the heuristic judgment delivered by S1." (P. 186)

"One might be tempted to thereby classify the FOR as a heuristic output that bears more similarity to the automatic, implicit response generated by S1 than by a true metacognitive judgment." (p. 186)

What this sentence sounds to me is that the author does not consider the outcome of S1 is not metacognitive. Unfortunately, at this stage, I will not be able to verify my interpretation with the author.

"It was argued that S2 intervention is linked to metacognitive processes of monitoring and control, and that these metacognitive processes are in turn linked to cognitive capacity." (p. 188)

Carruthers (2008). An architecture for dual reasoning.

Good thing that I came across this article after my psychotic model was edited by copyeditors 3 times. 8-X
I love how Dr. Carruthers had it put ....


Carruthers, P. (2008). An architecture for dual reasoning. In J. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond: Oxford University Press.

"I ... [have provided] a defense of one sort of dual systems theory. I have shown that there are good reasons for thinking that System 2 is realized in cycles of operation of System 1, utilizing mechanisms and processes that we have independent reason to believe in. The resulting account of System 2 is action-based, since it is activations and mental rehearsals of action schemata that initiate and sustain its operations." (p. 124)

Loftus & Palmer (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of the interaction between language and memory

One of the last articles to revisit before closing down on the DWM etc book.  This is a paper I encountered years back, possibly when taking the forensic psychology class at UBC. A classic in the field of eyewitness testimony, I think.

Loftus, E. F., & Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13(5), 585-589.

The following two tables captured the gist of the study. Essentially, participants in the study were shown clips of car accidents.


Table 1 showed us people's estimate of vehicle speed with a question in the form of "About how fast were the cars going when they [verb] each other?" (Please ad the verb of smashed, collided, bumped, hit, and contacted in yourself to complete the sentence.)
What results represented in Table 1 tell us is that the language (verb) used can bias people's recall of incidences and estimates based on the recall.

p. 586

In the experiment associated with Table 2 results, participants viewed a clip involving traffic accident and interrogated about car speed with the verb of "smashed" or "hit." Participants in the control group were not interrogated with the speed question. A week later, participants were requested to respond to the question, "Did you see any broken glass?" while no broken glass was shown in the clip.
Results shown in Table 2, again, indicated that the language used in probing people's recall of past events can have a significant impact on the restructuring and recall of past events.

p. 587

Apocalypse: The commonplace phenomena

Since I lived through Apocalypses so many a time in my world not shared by others, I decided to look up some stats on the prevalence rate of Apocalypse experienced by other patients with psychosis.

The only one I found so far is in a paper by Rudaleviciene, Stompe, & Narbekovas (2013) where the reported life-span prevalence rate of apocalyptic theme in institutionalized patients in their study is 69.8% (n=295).

Based on this stat, it's apparent that Apocalypse is a commonplace phenomena lived through by psychotic patients. Something absolutely normal, I guess. 8-O

As for the 30%+ who did not report the apocalyptic theme, since it was not until the second full-blown episode when I had to live through Apocalypses many a time, I wonder whether it's something that would never occur in their life span or else.  Regardless, good luck to that 30% and hope it doesn't occur to them.

Regardless, it's shameful for me to say that, although the bible is a classic, I have never read the bible.



Rudaleviciene, P., Stompe, T., & Narbekovas, A. (2013). 308 – Apocalyptic delusions. European psychiatry : the journal of the Association of European Psychiatrists, 28, 1.